The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition

The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition
Narendra Singh Sarila
Harper Collins, 2005
Pages 436,
Rs. 500 ISBN 81-7223-569-0

The Partition of India ranks as one of the 10 greatest tragedies in human history. Numerous scholars have attempted to focus on the political processes that led to the vivisection of India, the creation of Pakistan. Hardly are there literatures that concentrate on the link between India’s partition and British intentions. Notable among them is Narendra Singh Sarila’s ‘The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s partition’, which traces the influence of British strategic concern culminating in India’s Partition in 1947. In the light of certain rare documents, he ebulliently analyses a host of factors and forces that expressed British fears about USSR gaining control in the Middle East. This, he argues, compelled Britain to play what was called as ‘Great Game’ – a term coined by Arthur Connolly in 1840 and later popularized by Rudyard Kipling – against Russia.

Sarila has quoted chapter and verse to prove his point that Britain had deliberately planned the partition of India to protect its strategic and economic interests from the damaging consequences of its withdrawal from its vast empire in India. On June 3, 1947 the British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, while addressing the British Labour Party’s annual conference said that the division of India “would help consolidate Britain in the Middle East”. The whole approach of Britain then was to retain at least some part of India, hopefully in the North-West “for defensive and offensive action against the USSR in any future dispensation in the sub-continent”. What is clear is that even if there was no Jinnah, Britain would still have sought to vivisect India. A free India, Britain knew, would not care to play second fiddle to London; but a Muslim-dominated Pakistan, was as Jinnah its vilest proponent frequently made clear, only too willing to do so. The British then trimmed their sails to follow the directions of the Muslim League’s winds. Every time there was talk of delegating authority, London insisted on consulting the League along with the Congress. It is interesting to note that the formation of the League was itself at the instance of British. When it was first established on December 30, 1906, in Dacca, the League acknowledged the debt in its first resolution by saying that it would “foster a sense of loyalty to the British Government among the Muslims of India”.

Britain tried very hard to influence the United States in its strategic scheming in favor of India’s partition. But the US President Roosevelt wanted to see a free and independent India—and not a partitioned India. American pressure exerted on Britain in favor of India’s independence from 1942 onwards is clearly revealed. The Americans also advised Britain to keep India united. They feared that India’s Balkanization would help the communists. However by playing the Pakistan card, Churchill portrayed that the problem lay in Hindu-Muslim differences and not in Britain’s unwillingness to accept self-determination for India. Such a move brought Jinnah’s 1940 scheme for Partition and his two-nation theory centre stage.

The conversations with, and written communications to, the Viceroys were meticulously recorded by the British which do not fully emerge from the Indian records. Scholarly attention has been riveted on those complex negotiations, and their minutiae, leading to partition as well as on the personalities of Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, Patel, and others, and a substantial body of literature also exists on the manner in which the boundaries were drawn between India and Pakistan, on the western and eastern fronts alike. The book also dwells on portraying the personalities of the British Viceroys in India - Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten – and how they were responsible for the events that ultimately led to the partition of India.

The book also reveals how novice was the Indian Nationalists’ miscalculations, their ideals divorced from realities and their inexperience in the field of international politics emerges in their own words in the records. Firstly, the resignation of Congress ministries when they were in power in 1939 enabled Jinnah and his Muslim League to come to the fore. Secondly Congress was reluctant towards supporting the war effort further alienated Britain from the Congress party. Thirdly, before the Muslim League had entered the Constituent Assembly, Nehru agreed to include League ministers in the Interim Government in 1946. Fourthly, glaring mistakes were made in handling the Kashmir imbroglio.

The author cautiously drives home the fact that though Britain was responsible for India’s Partition, it did not support the partition plan to weaken India. In fact the British forced the Princes into the arms of India, except for Jammu and Kashmir. This step helped unify the fragmented parts into a cohesive one. Partition, according to the author, was thus a politico-strategic act to consolidate their power in the region.

Fifty-eight years after Partition, it is worth re-examining whether the British fears of Russia marching into the subcontinent were valid. With the end of Cold War communist Russia did invade Afghanistan and take control of the country. This is where Pakistan played the role the British envisaged. It provided the launch pad for American forces to beat back the Russians by arming the Afghan resistance, precipitating the collapse of the USSR and altering the world balance of power.

It is a most welcome addition to books dealing with the partition of India even while making one wonder how many more secrets still remain to be unveiled!

ELUSIVE PEACE IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS

As the people in all walks of life all over Bangladesh are still reeling from the bomb attacks of 15 March, a huge cache of sophisticated arms have been discovered and seized at Naikongchhari Upazill in Bandarban district of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of the Chittagong and Rajshahi zones and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) recovered latest model AK – 47 rifles, 7716 rounds of bullets of the rifles at the forest at Jaraliar Char in Naikongchhari. This entire scenario has led to the question as to what is happening in Chittagong Hill Tracts today?

Besides the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, the political and law and order situation in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have deteriorated alarmingly in recent times as the two main rival organizations of the region, Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) and the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), and several groups of armed cadres are resorting to open confrontations. Abductions are being followed by kidnappings while murders are being avenged by gruesome killings. A total of 500 persons were killed, around 100 abducted and more than 1000 injured during the last five years in CHT. As many as 24 armed clashes between the activists of PCJSS and UPDF had occurred during the same period. Besides, the miscreants were engaged in gun battles with army men and police eight times during the last four months. The armed cadres of both PCJSS and UPDF had set fire to tribal villages and markets in remote hill areas of CHT. Sources said the activities of the rival political parties in CHT resulted in more than 60 gunfights in the last eleven months. Moreover many incidents of abduction took place in the CHT including the kidnapping of three foreigners from Naniarchar under Rangamati district on February 16, 2001.

Looking back into the history of the CHT problem, (which this article intends to do) it is interesting to note that the CHT was an autonomously administered district, in British administered India and was safeguarded by the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900, which prohibited sale and transfer of land to non-indigenous people. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in southeastern Bangladesh covers an area of approximately 5,093 square miles, and borders India to the north and Myanmar (Burma) to the east. After the partition of British India in 1947, the CHT was given to Pakistan. As part of Pakistan, the Chittagong Hill Tracts lost its special status and autonomy under an amendment to the Pakistan Constitution in 1963. Pressure for land to cultivate had in the past led to the migration of large numbers of non-tribal people from other parts of Bangladesh into the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The government of Pakistan, in a bid to open up the hill tracts and tap its potential hydro-electric resources, constructed the Kaptai Dam in 1962 which submerged 54,000 acres - nearly 40 percent - of the best agricultural land, and displaced about 100,000 indigenous people. Prior to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the population of the area consisted almost entirely of people from 13 different indigenous tribes. Between 1964 and 1971, the Pakistan government amended Regulation 1 of the Act of 1900 to allow ‘migration of non-tribals into the hill tracts and transfer ownership of land and other resources of CHT to non-tribal people from the plains’. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 saw the projection of a homogenous Bengali nationalism, with the citizen of Bangladesh defined as a Bengali in the Constitution. No separate status or identity was recognised. This triggered the ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The struggle was spearheaded by Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Association, which is called as Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). Its armed wing, Shanti Bahini (peace force) was formed in 1972. As the struggle gathered strength, the government began relocating Bengalis in the CHT. Reports suggests that about ‘400,000 Bengalis were sent to the CHT, both to ease the pressure on the land in other parts of Bangladesh and to dilute the dominance of the hill people in CHT’. In 1975, when the struggle strengthened, nearly a third of the Bangladesh army was deployed in the CHT as the government looked for a military solution. As armed confrontation between the security forces and Shanti Bahini escalated, communal harmony between the tribals and 'new' Bengali settlers deteriorated further. Ten major massacres by Bengali settlers and the security forces since 1980, led to an exodus of the tribal population across the border to Tripura in India.

It is interesting to understand that successive governments in Bangladesh moved from a military solution to eventually calling for a political solution in 1987 when General Ershad initiated the first of six rounds of peace talks. These at times resulted in limited agreements between the two sides. One such agreement reached in 1985 between the Government of General Ershad and a breakaway faction of the PCJSS headed by Priti Kumar Chakma resulted in the surrender of some 300 fighters who accepted a rehabilitation package offered by the government, but was rejected by the PCJSS headed by J.B. Larma. Further meetings between General Ershad's Government and a committee representing elements from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, resulted in the establishment of three district elected councils in Rangamati, in Khagrachari and in Bandarban, each composed of a two-thirds tribal majority with a tribal chairperson. The councils, which continue to function, have limited administrative and supervisory authority over a number of government departments including Fisheries, Agriculture, Small and Cottage Industries, Public Health and Primary Education.

During these talks, the PCJSS presented the following five-point demand: Removal of non-indigenous peoples settled in the CHT after 1947; Withdrawal of all Bangladeshi armed forces from the CHT including non-indigenous police force; Retention of the CHT regulations of 1900 and a constitutional provision restricting its amendment; Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature and recognition of Jumma nation’s right to self-determination; and Deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force and implementation of these measures under the auspices of the UN. But the agreement of 1989 only provided for ‘limited autonomy’. It was largely rejected and armed insurgency continued.

The following year, in 1992, a multi-party committee composed of representatives from the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), the Awami League and Jamaat-e-Islami was constituted by the government to identify solutions to the CHT problem. In response, the PCJSS declared a unilateral cease-fire. Seven rounds of talks were reportedly held between the committee and the PCJSS (1992-96) under the aegis of the BNP-led government, but there were no concrete results.

In October 1996, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, following up on the previous dialogue efforts, set up the National Committee on CHT to reinitiate the peace process. The first meeting between the 12-member committee and the PCJSS was held in December, followed by other meetings. This was the last series of negotiations between the government and the PCJSS that ended in December 1997. Eventually, the talks resulted in the signing of a peace treaty on December 2, 1997 between the National Committee and the PCJSS in the presence of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The signing of the accord without outside mediation was an important achievement for both the Bangladesh Government and the tribal representatives.

The accord addresses four major issues in the CHT, namely: Devolution of power to the Hill District Councils, Regional Councils and CHT Ministry as the units of self-government in the CHT; Establishment of a land commission to deal with conflicts over land and natural resource rights; Recognition of the cultural integrity of the indigenous peoples and the CHT as a ‘tribal’ area and the withdrawal of military forces from CHT and the de-commissioning and rehabilitation of JSS forces.

Although the government has amended existing laws to provide for the implementation of the peace accord, the accord is facing a number of difficulties, which require urgent and continued attention.

● The first one is the slow pace of implementation by the government. Concern over this has been raised by the international community, by the human rights groups in and outside Bangladesh, and by the tribal people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, at times threatening to derail the peace process altogether.

● The second issue is that the accord is not recognized by the main opposition party, the BNP led by Begum Khaleda Zia. Although the process of achieving peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began at the time of the BNP government, the BNP has distanced itself from the accord which was finalized under the Awami League government, amid fears that should a future BNP government take office, it may seek to repeal the Awami League enacted legislation that uphold the accord. Begum Khaleda Zia, the then leader of the Opposition in Parliament and Chairperson of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), opposed the accord and called the accord a 'sell out'. However when the BNP came in to power in October 2001, it could not change this problematic state of the Peace Accord. One of the new government’s initial action with regards the CHT was the keeping of the portfolio for the Ministry of CHT Affairs with the Prime Minister, and the appointment of a non-indigenous person - from among the state sponsored settlers – and a BNP colleague as head of the CHT Development Board – which is blamed to be a step revealing of its indifference to the Jummas and the Peace Accord.

● A third issue is the position of the disaffected political groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts who consider the accord to have failed to respond to their aspiration of full autonomy. These include Pahari Gano Parishad (PGP or Hill Peoples Council), Pahari Chattra Parishad (PCP or Hill Students Council) and Hill Women Federation (HWF) who argue that the accord has failed to ''reflect the genuine hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and has failed to fulfill the main demands of the Jumma people namely, constitutional recognition to the national ethnic minorities of the CHT with guarantee for Full Autonomy, restoration of traditional land rights, demilitarisation of the area, and withdrawal and resettlement of the Bengali settlers in the plain land.''

These perspectives have the potential to aggravate local issues and increase the tension between the CHT communities inherent in any post-conflict situations. They could affect questions relating to the withdrawal of the army from certain camps which, despite the provisions of the accord, has been only partially implemented; the possession of land which continues to remain unresolved; the CHT seats in the parliament which have traditionally gone to the national parties providing them with an effective vehicle to impose their own political agenda in the area which could now be at variance with the policies of the Regional Council; and the judicial processes which the tribal people are reluctant to use due to years of mistrust and which the more litigant non-tribal people could use to settle their differences with the tribal people.

In any case, there is concern that expectations in these regards have not been fulfilled. The post–accord grievances relate to the government’s failure to make the CHT a completely demilitarized zone, though the government has its own considerations in deciding to maintain army camps in the region. The tribals are also unhappy with the lack of full implementation of resettlement benefits for the returnees. Besides, there is dissatisfaction over the fact that the internally displaced persons have not been fully rehabilitated. This has led the situation in CHT more and more worse, and the common people are becoming gradually violent against the government policies. So if the CHT Accord is not implemented properly, the situation of CHT may turn into new directions in future.

In Bible, Isaiah prophesied that ‘we shall know peace when we see the lamb lie down with the lion’. It is expected to come true in any conflict situation. Only if the warring parties come together for a mutual agreement, shall we expect sustainable peace.

SRI LANKAN TIGERS

The world is watching. And none of us – Tiger or anti-Tiger – can do without the world. Even if we can dispense with its aid and assistance we have to ensure that our enemies do not benefit from such support. The Tigers need the world not to ban them; legal sanctions could impede the free flow of cash from the Diaspora to the LTTE's coffers; national and regional proscriptions could also interfere with the excellent support work various Tiger front organisations scattered throughout the world are doing for the Sun God's Cause.

The Sri Lankan state needs economic and military assistance from friendly nations. Both the Lankan state and the anti-Tiger Tamils need the world to adopt a zero-tolerant policy towards the Tigers, leading ultimately to full UN sanctions. So whatever we may feel about the world, all of us need the world in our corner or at least not in our opponent’s corner.

And the world demands certain standards. OK there is no equal treatment here; quite a few Western countries are openly pro-LTTE, but there are others who are more balanced. True these countries do not practice what they preach. When something threatens their interests (even non-vital ones) they do all the things they are constantly telling us not to do. So there is a lot of hypocrisy and double standards, which can be downright exasperating at times. Unfortunately we need these countries more than they need us; we need them to back us; or, at the least, we need them not to back our opponents. That is the reality; therefore, hard as it is, we must accept it and try to make it work for us.

There is little doubt that the United States of America is a major human rights violator, and has been one for more than a century. Unfortunately this issue is of little relevance to the struggle against the Tigers. What is relevant is that the USA is taking a fairly hardline against the LTTE; what is important is to ensure that the USA stays on (and if possible progresses further along) this anti-Tiger track. This means keeping the ban against the LTTE in place and getting the Americans to back a total EU ban as well as UN sanctions on the Tigers. These international steps are necessary to weaken the Tigers locally. These decisions taken tens of thousands of miles away can help save the lives of anti-Tiger Tamils (especially children) here.

So we have to remember that the world is watching – watching not only the Tigers but also the Lankan state and the anti-Tiger Tamils. If the Lankan state and the anti-Tiger Tamils indulge in or condone the kind of practices which are being cited as reasons to ban/impose sanctions on the LTTE, it is unlikely that the international community can be persuaded to adopt a harder line vis-à-vis the Tigers. After all, if all the major parties to the conflict are violating the basic rights of civilians, if all of them are acting anti-democratically, if the differences among them are not of quality but of quantity, not of nature but of degree, why should only one party be penalised?

The US State Department Report

The US State Department Human Rights Report for 2005 is critical of all three major parties to the Lankan conflict – the Tigers, the government of Sri Lanka and anti-Tiger Tamil rebels. Some will argue that the report is not even handed while others will contend that the report is supportive of their side, deliberately ignoring the less favourable comments. But such arguments and contentions are irrelevant in the final analysis. What is relevant is the message conveyed by the Report: international support and recognition will not come free but will be subject to conditionalities. And these include respecting the basic human and democratic rights of civilians, even when such civilians are known supporters of the enemy.

There is much that the anti-Tiger Tamils can learn from the Tigers. My Way can be very beguiling, but it does not come without a price tag. The Tigers had their way in killing Rajiv Gandhi but that murder antagonised India and thus caused many disadvantages to the LTTE. The Tigers’ ill treatment of fellow Tamils (from the murder of political opponents and child conscription to extortion, violation of voting rights and many other impositions, major and minor) has created a many an enemy to the Tiger cause from within the Tamil society, some of whom are committed to the destruction of the Tigers. In fact it is the LTTE’s violence towards fellow Tamils which has caused that organisation to be banned in a number of countries and may result in eventual UN sanctions. If the Tigers did not practice suicide bombings, if they did not target civilians in general, if they did not abduct children and treat their own Tamil people so abominably, they would not have been banned in any international capital. Fighting to decapitate Sri Lanka would not have been really regarded as a criminal matter by the international community; terrorism and child abuse cannot but be.

The Tigers' total disregard for the basic rights and well being of their own people has cost them much. Ironically this is a fate that can easily befall their opponents, be it the Lankan state or the anti-Tiger Tamils. That is the warning contained in the US State Department Report and we can ignore it, gloss over it, only at our own peril.

The Tamil/Tiger struggle for separation would not have reached the heights it did if it was not for Black July. That mass scale and bloody violation of the basic rights of the Tamil people, including the right to life, by Sinhala mobs, as the Lankan state watched supinely, shocked India and the world. It provided a raison d’ être for the Tamil struggle, for the demand for separation. The horrors of July were used by the Tigers subsequently to justify their own departure from civilisational norms and for their deliberate targeting of Sinhala civilians. Still the world was not much bothered; after all, the Tigers were imposing on the Sinhalese what the Sinhalese imposed on the Tamils in 1983 – collective punishment. It was all tragic, but what goes around does come around, as everyone knows.

The Tigers' downfall began when they turned against fellow Tamils. Infrequently, such practices can be ignored; but not when they become the norm. And these were becoming the norm by mid to late 1990'. No one was spared; actual enemies, potential enemies, opponents, those who merely supported opponents, old and young, men and women, the famous and the unknown – they all met the same fate at the hands of the Sun God’s executioners. And in some parts of the world, gradually, the pennies began to drop; you cannot say you are the liberators of the Tamils and then follow a consistent policy of murdering every Tamil who disagree with you on any matter, in any way. Sooner or later your credibility will wear thin.

Why Oppose The Tigers?

Raison d’être This is a question that the anti-Tiger Tamils too must answer – why are they opposed to the LTTE? Is it simply because they want to get what the Tigers enjoy – power over Tamil people? Or is it because they disagree with some specific policy/s or activity/s of the Tigers? If so these should be spelt out and reflected in the policies and the conduct of the anti-Tiger Tamils.

If the anti-Tiger Tamils oppose the LTTE because of the LTTE’s anti-democratic nature they themselves must respect democracy; otherwise their arguments against the Tigers would sound hollow. If the anti-Tiger Tamils oppose the Tigers because the Tigers murder political opponents, they themselves must not murder or harass their own political opponents. If you are critical of the Tigers because they violate the fundamental rights of the Tamil people, then you cannot yourself violate the fundamental rights of the Tamil people. If you oppose the Tigers in name but follow their ways in deed, then neither the support of the Tamil people nor the recognition of the international community is likely to come your way.

The Tigers did impose and continue to impose terrible penalties on the Tamils who oppose them. Did that end the Tamil opposition to the Tigers? The Tigers’ violence did drive some people out of politics and some out of the country; but many others stayed and fought back. The prospect of being killed turned R Sampanthan into a willing tool of the Tigers, but hardened the resolution of V Anandasangaree to oppose the Tigers. The cold blooded murder of Rajini Rajasingham Thiranagama did not silence all of her colleagues; the courageous work carried out by the UTHR is symbolic of man’s Promethean spirit, his indomitable will to resist. The killing of Reggie Master did not discourage his brother or the other young men who are waging a dangerous, lonely but relentless battle in the East against the LTTE. Suresh Premachandran became a Tiger cipher but Douglas Devananda and D Siddartan did not. If violent intolerance is all that effective the anti-Tiger Tamils cannot exist. But they do.

And they should learn the lesson of their own example. Using violence to silence opponents is not only morally wrong; it does not work, even in the medium term. With violence you can silence some of your opponents all the time and all of your opponents some of the time; but not all of your opponents all the time.

Respect for democracy makes sense because in the final analysis it benefits not only the receiver but also the giver. When political pluralism prevails you have vociferous opponents but rarely bitter enemies, intent on mutual extermination. The unrelenting hostility that exists between the Tigers and the anti-Tiger Tamils is possible only in an anti-democratic context characterised by total intolerance. If the Tigers had a democratic and non-violent way to deal with dissidents, the Karuna rebellion would not have taken the trajectory it did. Despite all their sordid mistakes and repulsive antics the Southern parties have better ways of dealing with opposition and dissension. Because of the overall democratic context in which these parties operate the opponent of today can well become the supporter of tomorrow or vice versa. Ranil Wickremesinghe and any JVP parliamentarian can share a joke in the parliamentary lobby or sit together and converse amicably at a public function. There is definitely more than a degree of hypocrisy involved in such conduct but it is safer that way from a political and a societal point of view than the alternative.

The Tiger cannot be democratised. But to the degree possible the anti-Tiger Tamils must democratise themselves. A good place to begin would be by being unlike the LTTE. The Tiger way might seem a success but after three decades of fighting the LTTE does not have a liberated zone worth talking about. The Tiger way has also earned for the Tigers the undying enmity of a considerable number of Tamils. And whenever the anti-Tiger Tamils feel drawn to the path of total intolerance of the Tiger, the best antidote is to look at the nearest mirror.

LTTE Stakes its Shuttle

In the globalized world of today, the trajectory of internal conflicts are often influenced by international developments and pressures. Analysts of internal conflicts have concluded that an international pressure in internal conflicts is eventually inevitable as ‘a passive as well as an active factor’. This was explicit when the European Union had expressed its disagreement and agreed not to receive LTTE delegations in all its member countries. But the question is how to ensure such pressure is positive rather than negative?

In a statement issued on September 26, 2005 the European Union has condemned the continuing use of violence and terrorism by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It says, "The pursuit of political goals by such totally unacceptable methods only serves to damage the LTTE's standing and credibility as a negotiating partner and gravely endangers the Peace Process so much desired by the people of Sri Lanka. The statement goes further to reveal tough measures against the LTTE by stating that it is actively considering the formal Listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. In the meantime, the European Union has agreed that with immediate effect, delegations from the LTTE will no longer be received in any of the EU Member States until further notice.

It has come as a serious blow to the support links of LTTE. It is an open-secret that for the LTTE, most of the support – morally and monetarily – comes in hand from Europe. The presence of considerable numerical strength of Tamil Diaspora in and around Europe has given them legitimate rights to influence the policy decisions of those countries viz-a-viz Sri Lanka. With the exception of the USA, UK, Australia and India, which has banned the LTTE as a terrorist outfit, a number of European governments have followed a policy of constructive engagement with both parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka. ‘Constructive engagement’ with the LTTE has meant direct interaction with the LTTE in Kilinochchi, on issues relevant to the peace process, reconstruction and rehabilitating activities and hosting LTTE delegations in their own countries.

Since the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002, the LTTE has made several tours to Europe. In the past, the Sri Lankan government has encouraged these visits, in the belief that it is a ‘useful exercise’ for the LTTE to learn about democracy, concepts of governance, power sharing, federalism etc., and ‘to broaden their horizons and that it will assist in their transformation from a terrorist outfit to a democratic institution’. Today the government says ‘all this would have been okay if there had been reforms in the LTTE, if the group had started embracing democracy and human rights. Otherwise what is the point?’ The government wants the West to show its commitment against terrorism by taking steps that would force the LTTE to give up a policy wedded to violence and assassinations.

The Sri Lankan government believes that the European community has an important role to play by applying pressure on the LTTE. The recent Kadirgamar assassination has thrown up hard questions about the credibility of LTTE. The Sri Lankan Government is happy with the strong condemnations by the West in the wake of the Kadirgamar killing but feels these are not enough. According to Jayanth Dhanapala, ‘the route of appeasement or the carrot and more carrots approach, have not worked with the LTTE and hence there is a need for concerted international action that is immediate and tangible against the LTTE, to include not only those that have a bearing on the LTTE, but also its numerous front organizations in many countries through which it continues its reign of terror in Sri Lanka’.

As a result, the recent statement of the EU refers to the LTTE activities in the member countries and agreed that ‘each Member State will, where necessary, take additional national measures to check and curb illegal or undesirable activities (including issues of funding and propaganda) of the LTTE, its related organizations and known individual supporters.’

Opposing the statement of the EU, Tamil National Alliance (TNA) said it cannot accept the decisions European Union has taken against the LTTE. This would only distant away LTTE from entering into mainstream politics. If the European Union was really committed to finding a peaceful solution to the Sri Lanka’s ethnic issue they should ‘condemn every unwarranted act of parties concerned’.

The actions advocated by the EU may be seemed to be unwarranted or pregnant with consequences inimical to the professed goals of ‘peace in Sri Lanka’. As Sri Lanka enters a democratic process of electing a new President, it is imperative not to bother both the warring parties even by a third party. This may be an opportune moment to undertake a fundamental review or ‘redesign’ of the peace process in Sri Lanka. But the question is: Can you maximize the space for Peace in Sri Lanka by minimizing the space for LTTE?

Tsunami, Sri Lanka and the LTTE

The December 26, 2004 Tsunami killed over half a million people and rendered a million people homeless in the island country. It was a double blow to the war-ravaged north and east of Sri Lanka, which was just beginning to recover from two decades of bitter ethnic conflict. However the tsunami disaster has prompted a massive global aid response. But getting much needed supplies to the estimated 5 million people in the region who have lost their homes is no easy task. As such it was the prime duty of the government in power devoid of party politics to disburse the relief funds and implement rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes for all the affected areas of the country irrespective of ethnicity and regional diversity.

The troubles over Sri Lanka's tsunami aid distribution has reached a climax after the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a memorandum of understanding on 24 June 2005 for setting up a joint mechanism (JM) to carry out the post- tsunami reconstruction work. This is called as the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). The final document on the JM was presented to the Sri Lankan Parliament amidst protests by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and by the Muslim supporters. Why should JVP, since then a part of the government, protest? Why should the Muslims oppose the JM? In what way international actors have influenced this JM?

The P-TOMS, said as a simple a mechanism aimed at planning to share US $4.0 billion in the international tsunami aid with the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Government to work out ways and means to rehabilitate millions who are affected by the tsunami in the country. The P-TOMS or the Joint Mechanism consists of three tiers headed by a high level committee comprising three members - one government nominee, one nominee by Muslim parties and one LTTE nominee. The objective of the JM is to ‘equitably share the massive resources pledged for Tsunami relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation, between the worst affected North and East and the rest of the country particularly the South’. Talking about P-TOMS, the Sri Lankan President said that, ‘the proposed structure was not a pact with the LTTE but merely an arrangement to facilitate tsun! ! ami relief distribution with the participation of all communities’.

International donors have pledged four billion US dollars in post-conflict reconstruction aid and added another billion US dollars for the tsunami reconstruction effort. Europe seems to involve itself not just by monetary means but also through its actual influence politically. Norway is playing a role of Coordinator, supported by the donors to play its part between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The British Development Minister Gareth Thomas underlined the importance of setting up a JM with the LTTE for tsunami relief coordination.

On the contrary, the argument the JVP parliamentary leaders endeavored to develop in Sri Lanka’s legislature in opposing the signing of the Joint Mechanism is that the LTTE, which has waged war against the Government of Sri Lanka since 1983 to win a separate state and subsequently an internationally-recognized ‘statehood’, will soon satisfy the basic criteria set out by the Montevideo Convention to gain the United Nations recognition for a “State of Tamil Eelam.”

LTTE on its part, went about systematically to organize its international effort to collect support in cash and kind from all over the world directly, independent of TRO’s own efforts. It set up special action committees for collecting funds in ten countries including France, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Germany, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Holland and Australia. Whether one likes it or not, the plain fact is that the LTTE is in actual control of vast extent of north-east and can influence events in much of the ‘cleared’ areas as well. It is also in a position of military parity with the Sri Lankan State, which is the raison d'être for the ceasefire agreement. This is the ground reality. Therefore an amicable inclusion of LTTE in the JM is unavoidable.

However the Muslims, who were one among the worst hit in the tsunami tragedy, feel that they have been cheated in the secret tripartite parleys between the government, the LTTE and the Norwegian peace brokers on the Joint Mechanism. It was accused that the document on the mechanism finalized after several rounds of discussions tends to favor the LTTE and has ‘not recognized the immense suffering borne by the Muslims’. A Muslim leader said that ‘the Muslims want parity (with LTTE), if not a majority, as a basic safeguard’.

Thus, the Tsunami offered both the Sri Lankan government and LTTE a very good opportunity to set aside their differences for the time being and get involved in relief and rehabilitation work together. It is time they put their money where their mouth is and convert their mere proposal into concrete action now. Isn’t it true that, ‘natural calamities are great levellers as they affect friend and foe alike’?

Tsunami, LTTE and the Government

Friends, those of you who are keeping in track of the ongoing Tsunami-rehabilitation process that has just started between LTTE and the Government, might as well wonder why such trivial complexities are in place rather than life-saving simple solutions…

Trudging along to secure some kind of normalcy after the devastating tsunami attack of December 26, the government of President Kumaratunge is finding itself bombarded by accusations from the LTTE and the opposition parties that it just isn't 'doing enough'. Close on the heels of the LTTE complaints comes those of the Muslims with the head of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, Rauf Hakeem, stating that the government was not prepared to trust other political parties with regard to relief measures.

Now is that the island government has proposed a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) to be operational for an initial period of one year across a two-km belt in the tsunami-affected region. It is interesting to note that a regional fund has also been proposed with a multilateral agency as a "custodian" for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the six tsunami-affected districts in the north and east. According to current indications, the World Bank is likely to be the custodian !!!

According to a source close to the President, the meetings by Ms. Kumaratunga are aimed at exploring all possible political options to pursue the P-TOMS and maintain government stability.

Agitations, fasts and protests against Post Tsunami Operational Mechanism Structure (P-TOMS) are also on the ground which expose the acts of exploiting human misery for mean political agenda of the leaders and by a section of the Buddhist clergies in the South.It is learnt that P-TOMS, the aid relief mechanism structure has been worked out between Jayantha Dhanapala Secretary General of the Government Peace Secretariat assisted by his officials and S.Puleedevan, Secretary General of the LTTE Peace Secretariat and Dr Joy Maheswaran, LTTE’s rehabilitation specialist.

The P-TOMS, said as a simple a mechanism aimed at planning to share US $3.0 billion in the international tsunami aid with the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lanka Government to work out ways and means to rehabilitate millions who are affected by the tsunami in the country. Norwegian, according to sources, facilitated the talks between the two Secretariats to come to a consensus regarding the shape and form of the PTOMS. The aid mechanism will initially last one year and can be extended later if both sides agree, Tamilselvan pointed out. In the meantime international donors are also of the view that PTOMS is an aid sharing mechanism to help the millions of Sri Lankan who are displaced and affected by December 26 tsunami devastation.

A diplomat of one of donor countries told that Sri Lankan leaders are bent on making their parochial politics over the misery of the millions of Sri Lankans. He said that ‘neither the Buddhists clergies nor political leaders agitated or showed any sign of defiance, when the worst happened on 22 February 2002, at the time when Ranil Wickremasinghe signed the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE, which virtually declared the existence of two states in the Country and the areas controlled by LTTE as an ad hoc state where it is virtually under the control of Tiger Supremo – Prabaharan’.

Information as of now suggests that, right now the situation has not ripened for a fruitful deal. I am not in a position to forecast a possible turnout of the events. Let me keep my fingers crossed. Anyway I will try my level best to update the events on this issue.

Failed Attempt: Suicide Attack or Peace Process?

Failed suicide attacks by the Tamil Tigers have been few, in terms of not being able to liquidate the intended target. Even on such an occasion, one or several others were killed in the attack. The human weapons of the LTTE achieved huge success and wide publicity to its rationale for ethnic backlash from 1983. However, more than increased security checks and surveillance, the proceeding peace process thinned the suicide bombings. It is at this prime time on 7 July 2004, that a suicide bomber blew herself up at a Colombo police station reportedly the 263rd attack on the organization's honour roll.

The Sri Lankan government has strongly condemned the incident, calling it another assassination attempt for the Tamil politician Douglas Devananda who is also the minister for Hindu Cultural Affairs. "The perpetrators of this act show callous disregard for human lives and are reverting to violence as a means of settling disputes," the government statement said.

Silence from the LTTE seems to confirm their responsibility for the attack which bears all the hallmarks of their organisation. The LTTE's subsequent denial of authorship of the suicide bombing can be linked to the active involvement of the international community in Sri Lanka's peace process. However, as a Sri Lankan military spokesman remarked "it is too early to say whether the bomb blast was an act of war by the Tigers." By assumption, if the rebels intend to initiate the war again, it would be with a series of simultaneous bombings and not just one. Another assumption is that the bomber expected to be escorted to the police station and that was her intended target. Few analysts opine that the suicide mission was destined to assassinate Col. Karuna, who was believed to hole up in that building.

By and large the wide conception of this dreaded act is subscribed to LTTE and that the suicide bomber was apparently on a mission to assassinate the cabinet minister, Douglas Devananda, a fierce critic of the Tigers who publicly encouraged the LTTE's rebellious military commander Col. Karuna to enter mainstream politics. Despite its failure, the explosion marks a malevolent start to Sri Lanka's most-dreaded month of "Black July", when the Tigers, in the past, carried out either individual assassinations or attacks on economic and military installations to mark the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983. The last time the suicide bomber struck in the island was in October 2001, but the target, the then Prime Minister, Ratnagiri Wickremasinghe, escaped from the attack. Earlier a suicide bomber in Colombo killed a cabinet minister CV Gunaratne in June 2000.

The most prominent survivor of the LTTE's human bomb attack is Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka. A woman Tiger suicide bomber made an attempt on the life of Kumaratunga at an election rally in Colombo on 18 December 1999. Kumaratunga the first politician to survive such an attack had a miraculous escape but permanently lost sight in her right eye. On the same day, another suicide blast had occurred at an opposition election rally killing Maj Gen (Retd) Lucky Alagama, former Chief of Army Staff and others. At that time, analysts held that Alagama was targeted because he was reportedly tipped to be appointed as the Defence Minister of Sri Lanka if the UNP was to win the Presidential election.

Not many knew until recently that there is a separate wing in the LTTE known as Karum Puligal or Black Tigers to maneuver such suicide missions. The Black Tigers are constituted exclusively of cadres who have volunteered to sacrifice their life for the benefit of the organisation and its objective of Eelam. The mindset of the LTTE suicide bomber is distinct from his/her West Asian counterpart. The LTTE suicide bomber is motivated by his/her political environment as well as by the indoctrination carried out by the organisation. As Prabhakaran stated, "with perseverance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in 100 years. But if we conduct Black Tiger operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time."

These suicide bombers have short-circuited the cry of an eye for an eye. They are beyond the reach of vengeance now and so that vengeance has become distinctly second order. While the animating 'why' of terrorism seems dark and difficult, there are answers that can lead to a solution some day. Until now, searches and arrests made on the basis of accurate and timely intelligence tip-offs have succeeded in eroding the LTTE's compartmentalized infrastructure to conduct suicide attacks. Therefore the response should not be just with the guns , but by seeking to create confusion, conflict and competition among the perpetrators, which the Sri Lankan government is conniving. In the end, however, what counts is what we fight for, not what we oppose.

Can Environmental Security Bring Peace to Jammu and Kashmir? ? I

Tourism, handicrafts, agriculture, forests, lakes... these have formed Jammu and Kashmir’s basis of survival, always. They still constitute 98% of the state’s economy and sustain 90% of its population.? Kashmir’s economy is nothing but a sensitive and organised use of its ecology. After two decades of living under the shadow of the gun, hope is finally making a comeback in the state. The new Union government led by Manmohan Singh has pledged to solve the Kashmir problem by all means, Kashmir will have to turn to its immense environmental resources to sustain this resurgence.

In its meeting held on 23 January 2004, the state cabinet accorded approval to its path-breaking Industrial Policy 2004. Environmental protection was given thrust in this policy. It states that “Environment protection has become an issue of global importance. To protect our environment and prevent damage to our land and water resources, the government would support water management systems with central and state’s resources.” Why has the government turned its attention to the environment?? Can proper environmental management policies bring peace to the valley? These are questions which are worth examining.

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India’s largest fresh water lake, the Wular, supplies around 40% of the valley’s fish and the lotus stem trade and is a tourist attraction. What the Nile is to Egypt, Wular is to Jammu and Kashmir. According to the London-based Kashmir Environment Watch Association, “due to siltation, expanding human settlement, ineffective water policy and night curfews this 202sq.km. lake is reduced to just 74sq.km. in three decades”. If the Wular is dying, Kashmir’s most famous icon ? the Dal Lake is already being prepared for its funeral. The Lake and Waterways Development Authority, created to save the lake with a budgetary allocation of Rs.500 crore, is busy preparing software that will decide when the Dal Lake would die. Death of the Dal means a life sentence for the 40,000 people who reside in and eke out their livelihood from it.

The Environment Minister Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Sofi said that the cultivation of saffron, one of the mainstays of the sector, has been badly hit due to poor water planning. Kashmiri saffron, which provides a livelihood to at least 7 lakh people, is losing its market to low-grade and cheaper saffron from Iran. Horticulture, another cash-earning sector is similarly afflicted, again due to the poor water management and lack of processing facilities.

Of late, the state has been gearing up for another conflict: rights over water. On 2 March 2003, the Jammu and Kashmir assembly passed a resolution asking the central government to review the Indus Water treaty with Pakistan. The Indus River Water Treaty is fast emerging as the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The treaty gives Pakistan unrestricted access to water of three rivers ? Chenab, Jhelum and Indus, flowing through Jammu and Kashmir. While the treaty eased Punjab’s water woes, Jammu and Kashmir suffered as it could not harness its rivers to their full potential. The treaty limits Jammu and Kashmir’s right to build storage reservoirs on the Jhelum and Chenab. This, the state argues, has meant that it has had to sacrifice an estimated potential power generation capacity of 15,000 MW. The state contends that it should have received compensatory access to power and water generated on the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas systems. According to Qazi Mohammed Afzal, Minister for Public Health, but for the treaty, the state could have increased its area under irrigation by one lakh acres, over and above the 83,000 acres which was under irrigation before 1960. The Finance Minister, Muzzaffar Hussain Beig, pointed out that the treaty’s implications affect the farmers in the state who have requested the government to take a strong stand against it. Jammu and Kashmir is also presently facing severe water scarcity as a result of a six-year dry spell.

In view of these issues, management of water in the state assumes critical importance. In the Kandi area in Jammu, the water management programmes need to utilise the 500 ponds that are in ruins at the moment.? Some of these ponds, spread over 10 acres, can meet the entire needs of the region if properly planned. The government’s two major irrigation programmes ? Integrated Watershed Development Programme and the Ravi-Tawi Irrigation Project ? still have lessons to learn on water management.? A case in point is that of the proposed Rs.57 crore Kandi Development Project. The World Bank funded Integrated Watershed Programme is about to complete its second phase this year. During an interaction with farmers in February, the Chief Minister admitted that the state must revert to traditional means for ensuring water security at the grassroots.

Can Environmental Security Bring Peace to Jammu and Kashmir? ? II

Kashmir has many problems with its environment’s stability, which can be tackled if the policy makers can make a plan that takes into account not only ecological conditions but also the living conditions of the people. Kashmir once known as "paradise on earth," home to vast area of forest cover and wildlife reserves including some species so rare they existed only in Kashmir are now quickly falling victim to the desolation which has encompassed much of this land. This is due to shoddy environmental management as well as the effects of terrorism. A 150-year old Deodar tree, worth about Rs.1,50,000 buys three AK-56 assault rifles. The result: most militant organisations have resorted to felling trees to finance their killing machines.

Even though the forests were kept out of bounds for its people, they sustained 50% of the state’s population living in and around them. The state’s famed woodcraft trade, employing close to one lakh people and the source of the cricket bat industry, draws its sustenance from these forests. In 2003, the World Cup fever ensured sales of about 2 million willow bats.

In 1980, an extraordinary cabinet meeting of the state government had declared that the forests of the state had shrunk from 21,000sq.km. to 13,000sq.km. in about 50 years. In March 2004, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Sofi, Minister for Environment, had said “the forest cover has come down by 20% in the last two decades, and agricultural productivity has decreased by 50%, particularly in the last 5 years”. The state has a huge live stock population and there are no grazing pastures available in the valley.

The wildlife population throughout the valley is rapidly declining because of extensive deforestation resulting in the loss of their natural habitat. For the past seven years widespread use of high velocity rifles by security forces in villages and forests surrounding the Valley in their pursuit to apprehend the Kashmiri militants, have further added to the total loss of specie lives lost in an already precarious situation. Rare species like the snow leopard, Kashmiri otter, flying squirrel, long-tailed Himalayan marmot and Kashimiri stag or hangul have now almost become extinct. Over 300 species of birds which included pheasants, quills, partridges, vultures, kites, eagles and a large number of other colorful birds have virtually disappeared. Today those forests stand naked and void of any visible sign of birdlife.

Permanent snowfall on mountains has receded, average temperatures in the Valley have risen and the amount of rain and snowfall has significantly diminished. The combined effect of deforestation and mismanagement of water resources has resulted in soil erosion which is responsible for the frequent flash floods now seen in the state. At present, there is no effective legislation in force to prevent environmental and ecological damage which is being inflicted upon the natural resources of this beautiful Himalayan country. Jammu and Kashmir’s first forest policy, which appeared in 1990, has been a victim of the state’s sole preoccupation ? militancy. “Political instability has facilitated the process of environmental degradation” says A R Wani, a retired Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF). The only way ahead, therefore lies in sustainable management and utilization of the state’s natural resource. According to a seminar, “Jammu and Kashmir: Vision 2020”, organised recently by the state, its natural resources could generate close to Rs.10, 000 crore in a few years given the right policy focus and political will.

The Jammu and Kashmir State Forest Corporation (SFC) established in July 1979 is the sole agent for harvesting forests. But due to ineffective policies, forest resources have been wasted. What, however, is of essence in this proposed use of ecology is participation by the people; the state will have to loosen its iron grip and let the people take over. For instance, community-based forestry can ensure sustainable harvesting of the willow tree, which caters to the multi-million rupee cricket bat market. Agriculture, which depends on rain for irrigation, could get a boost if the traditional canals are revived and managed by the community. This is what the Chief Minister’s “healing touch” has to act on and immediately.

In March 2004, the Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, had said “smuggling gets a fillip due to our bad policy” and discussed his government’s vision of a new forest policy. The proposed new forest policy aims at making forests more accessible to people by adopting the Joint Forest Management programme to involve communities in conservation. Mufti carries an immense responsibility on his shoulders: that of being the state’s Chief Environmental Officer, as well as its Chief Minister.

Human Smuggling in Sri Lanka

Human smuggling and trafficking are matters of increasing concern to the South Asian states. Despite successful raids to curb the flow of illicit immigrants to western countries, a large number of persons from SAARC countries continue to arrive in Sri Lanka with the idea of migrating to western countries illegally with the help of local smugglers who have links with international human smuggling rings. Recent interceptions of Sri Lankan vessels attempting to smuggle people to Italy have highlighted the increasing sophistication of people-smuggling operations, and the involvement of organized crime groups in this activity. This has alerted the Interpol to assist the Sri Lankan Police to help curb this menace. The problem has become so acute that the Sri Lankan CID has set up a special branch to deal with anti-human smuggling operations and sought the assistance of the Interpol in Egypt to help curb these activities.

In a pre-dawn raid conducted on three hotels at Kirinda and in Tissamaharama areas during last month (March), about 112 Indians and 6 Pakistani nationals and three hotel managers were arrested by a team of CID officers who were suspected of forfeited passports. Although the suspects had arrived in Sri Lanka with valid passports the CID sleuths are checking the authenticity of these passports in light of 10,000 genuine passports being stolen or missing from Pakistani nationals. The Interpol Headquarters have also been alerted of the ring of Pakistani nationals involved in the cross-boarder human smuggling operations along with Sri Lankans. Most of them are smuggled to Western countries.

Recently the Sri Lankan courts sentenced 269 Sri Lankans to a term of one year RI and fined each Rs.50,000 and cases are yet to be filed against 15 to 20 agents who organized these foreign jaunts for these innocent youth. This act of surreptitious entry of people into alien nation facilitated by a third party is driven by two different goals: smuggling by friends and relatives who may assist illegal entry for personal reasons and smuggling for profit conducted by organized groups in a deliberate evasion of the immigration laws.

The United Nations in the Global Program Against Trafficking in Human Beings defines smuggling as the procurement of illegal entry of a person into a State of which the latter person is not a national with the objective of making a profit. In case of Sri Lanka, some pay, knowing that they are acting illegally; some pay, having been led to believe they are acting legally, but merely jumping the queue; some cannot afford to pay the full amount, and are willing to work off the debt in the new country; some are totally unaware of what is happening to them - they have either been kidnapped and sold, or in the case of some children, sold by their impoverished families, who were badly affected by the ethnic conflict.

By Resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee open to all States for the purpose of elaborating a new International Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The focus is on trafficking in migrants and the prevention and suppression of smuggling of migrants by sea, with special attention being paid to the distinction between the criminalisation of trafficking and the protection of victims of that activity (UN General Assembly, 1999).

While not all undocumented migration is facilitated by organised crime, some operations epitomise the sophisticated end of criminal operations. In Sri Lanka, the modus operandi is to load the persons from a point along the western coast and make them undergo a rigorous journey for a period of three to four weeks before reaching Cairo in Egypt through the Suez Canal. The agents are mainly fish mudalalis who own large boats. In Cairo, the agents charge 600 US dollars from each to smuggle them to Italy. It is also reported that the LTTE has a part in such operations for organizing support to their cause.

A large number of persons from SARRC countries arrive in Sri Lanka due to liberalisation of visa procedures and many of them attempt to travel to western nations by boat illegally. In a bid to discourage human smuggling, the Italian government had even offered 1,000 lawful jobs to Sri Lankans according to the Italian Ambassador in Sri Lanka.? It is therefore necessary for the Sri Lankan government to frame maritime investigation and enforcement powers against foreign flag vessels. Necessary Bills should be passed which would help the coast watch officials to board and detain suspect vessels in international waters. Coast watch officers shall also be armed and can have increased powers of detention and search of people aboard vessels suspected of having committed offences against the Migration Act, the Customs Act and the Fisheries Management Act.