NATO STRATEGIC FATIGUE SPAWNS DANGEROUS ALTERNATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan my be passing through a critically testing military stage presently but what is disconcerting is that there seems to be an inspired campaign underway in the Western media and think- thanks to project that strategic fatigue has set-in in the United States and NATO policy establishments. Such projections would lead one to believe that the United States/NATO combine is exploring exit strategies from Afghanistan.

Available indicators suggest that while strategic fatigue may have set-in in some NATO participants in Afghanistan due to domestic pressures, the same cannot be said of the United States.

United States military operations in recent times have acquired added vigor after a review of United States operational strategy this year. The year 2008 marks the final denouement in United States – Pakistan military coalition (so-called) against global terror. While strategic analysts, including this Author, were constantly pointing out that Pakistan was double-timing the United States all along, it took the United States policy establishment six years to finally recognize it.

In fact what we are witnessing today in Afghanistan is not an Afghan civil war but a puny state like Pakistan (its nuclear weapons notwithstanding) challenging the military might of the global only superpower, namely the United States, through asymmetric war through its proxy insurgent outfit – the Taliban.

The aim of United States military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 was to evict the brutal medieval Islamic Jehadi regime from Kabul for its role in brutally converting Afghanistan into the Mecca of Islamic Jehad which acted as a magnet for the Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from the Islamic world. At the time of its military intervention in Afghanistan, the United States was aware that Pakistan was criminally culpable for 9/11 events and the hosting of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The United States ignored all that and finds itself in the present strategic quagmire that Pakistan’s treachery generated for USA.

Post-9/11 and up till now, Pakistan nurtured and regrouped the Taliban within Pakistan hoping that with strategic fatigue eventually creeping in US-NATO combine the Taliban could be used once again as an instrument of its strategic objective to enslave Afghanistan.

The armed conflict turbulence in Afghanistan today is a violent contest between the US-NATO combine to stabilize Afghanistan and the Taliban (with Pakistani support) attempting to regain control over tracts of territory in Southern Afghanistan, more specificall, before a final push to Kabul.

With the Taliban unable to make major strategic gains, an inspired campaign is underway, exploiting the gullibility of highly paid Western journalists in Kabul and also some Western think tanks and intellectuals to over-hype and over-sensationalize Taliban gains in Afghanistan and minimize the tactical successes of US-NATO military forces.

This inspired campaign has spawned in its wake some dangerous alternatives detrimental to United States strategic interests, namely to explore an exit strategy from Afghanistan and secondly to co-opt the Taliban in a dialogue with the Karzai Government with the ultimate aim of Taliban sharing political power in Kabul.

While the first dangerous alternative is not being seriously considered, the second dangerous alternative of dialogue with the Taliban has made some tentative gains with Afghan-Taliban dialogue in Saudi Arabia engineered by Pakistan and British intelligence agencies with a grudging nod by USA.

It is amazing and the height of strategic naivety for the United States to have given a nod to the second dangerous alternative by pressuring Afghan President Karzai for Afghan participation in a dialogue with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia.

Can it be forgotten that 9/11 would have never taken place had “The Other Axis of Evil” of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were pre-empted by the United States from the creation of Taliban and ensconcing of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Can it also be forgotten that the inclusion of “moderate Taliban” in the Kabul Government in 2002 was mooted by Pakistan’s General Musharraf to ensure Pakistan’s hold in Kabul and was wisely rejected by USA. A Taliban has no shades; the Taliban are a fundamentalist Islamic armed insurgent militia believing in medieval brutality.

How come that the inclusion of the Taliban in an Afghan-Taliban political dialogue has been brought about? Reports indicate that this has been advocated by European countries, and particularly Britain.

The United States policy establishment should take this as a wake-up call and prevent such dangerous alternatives taking shape which are grossly in contradiction and capable if endangering United States global and regional strategic interests.

To highlight the dangers to US national security interests by advocacy of dangerous and defeatist alternatives, this Paper intends to examine the following perspectives:

• United States Strategic Interests in Afghanistan
• Taliban No Strategic Asset for United States
• Taliban is a Strategic Asset for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
• Afghanistan is a Strategic Asset for United States and Not Pakistan
• Afghanistan Can be Reclaimed by United States as a Moderate, Democratic Islamic State
• US Intellectuals Must Disabuse Their Minds that Pakistan’s Sensitivities are Paramount in Solution of Afghanistan Conflict

United States Strategic Interests in Afghanistan

United States strategic Interests in Afghanistan should determine the centrality of all United States policies and strategies in the securement of Afghanistan as a stable state and its protection against Islamic fundamentalist onslaughts.

The United States when it entered Afghanistan in its military intervention and secured Kabul in 2002 with the assistance of Northern Alliance Forces had a two pronged strategy, namely (1) Regime change in Afghanistan by evicting the Taliban occupation of Afghanistan and (2) Dismantle the Islamic Jihadi terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The United States succeeded in both its strategic aims except that Pakistan pre-empted the capture of Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership and cadres by spiriting them away to sanctuaries within Pakistan, out of reach of US Forces.

In gross contradiction to US strategic aims the United States airlifted nearly 12,000 Pakistan Army operatives who provided the backbone of the Taliban from Kunduz away from retribution by Afghan tribesmen whom they had brutalized for nearly six years. This was a strategic blunder which is now costing heavily to the United States.

Notwithstanding the strategic blunders above, with the passage of time, United States strategic interests in Afghanistan today can be assessed as follows (1) Afghanistan’s emergence as a stable, democratic and moderate Islamic state contributing to regional stability (2) Afghanistan as a base for extension of American influence in Central Asia (3) Afghanistan as a possible springboard for neutralizing Iran (4) Afghanistan as a base for any future neutralization of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (5) In any future confrontation with China, Afghanistan’s territory touching China and Afghan air bases can be crucial pivots for US military operations.

The United States therefore must cultivate and craft a long term strategic vision to ensure its presence in Afghanistan coupled with transformation and build-up of Afghanistan as a stable nation immune to Pakistani and Taliban covetous designs.

Taliban No Strategic Asset for United States

The strong advocacy of those favoring entering into a political dialogue with the Taliban and their inclusion in political power-sharing in Kabul would have been logical and understandable had there been even a remotest chance that the Taliban could be transformed into a strategic interest for the United States. The picture, however, is otherwise.

The Taliban are mercenary free-booters with no stake in the stability of Afghanistan. The Taliban are a creation and an instrument of the Pakistan Army tasked with the forcible subjugation of Afghanistan as a client state of Pakistan. Their operational strategies are pronouncedly medieval Islamic brutalism which is alien to the Afghan psyche

With such credentials the Taliban hardly qualify to be a strategic asset for the United States in any future US plans for Afghanistan. More frankly, the Taliban are the very anti-thesis of whatever the United States stands for in Afghanistan and their cooption would be an insult to all US-NATO lives lost in Afghanistan in defense of democracy and freedom.

Taliban is a Strategic Asset for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

As a follow-up of the above, the United States needs to recognize that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were strategic assets of the “Other Axis of Evil” namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both were instrumental in spawning the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and for 9/11 too. Please refer to the Author's Paper No. 548 dated 12/11/2002 entitled "United State and the Other Axis of Evil".

The above position continues today. Pakistan ensconced the Afghan Taliban hierarchy and the Taliban Shura under direct protection of the Pakistan Army in Quetta where it continues untouched till today. Surprisingly, the United States which has now become active in attacking Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda hide-outs within Pakistan in FATA has not touched Quetta where Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban are housed and from where all Taliban major operations in Southern Afghanistan are launched from.

Pakistan’s obsession with Afghan Taliban persists became it still remains as the only instrument to ensure Afghanistan’s subjugation as a client state of Pakistan subservient to its Pakistani strategic designs.

It needs to be recorded that Pakistan views the Pakistani Taliban as a threat to its security, but views and nurtures the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset to be used for forcing the exit of USA from Afghanistan.

Is it not diabolical that the Pak-Saudi-sponsored Afghan-Taliban dialogue in Saudi Arabia should have the notorious Mujahideen leaders like Haqqani and Hekmatyar present there the same time? It does not augur well for the United States.

Saudi Arabia’s interest in the Taliban associated with the Al Qaeda as a strategic asset has been re-invented. In the words of Fareed Zakaria, Editor of News week: “Bin Laden began his struggle hoping to topple the Saudi regime. He is now aligned with the Saudi monarchy as it organizes against Shiite domination.”

Can it be over-looked that today Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are more closer to China than the United States. Can it be overlooked that both also are not on the best of terms with Iran.

Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have plans to use the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda in their future strategic blueprints. Convergence exists again between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to place a Taliban Government in Kabul.

Afghanistan is a Strategic Asset for Untied States and Not Pakistan

The United States today is at strategic cross-roads in Greater South West Asia. It has a stark choice in deciding what are going to be its priorities in the region.

Pakistan is once again headed for state failure or worse state-disintegration as a result of its internal contradictions, exploiting Islamic Jehadi impulses as a foreign policy and strategic instrument and divisive tendencies within Pakistan.

Afghanistan on the other hand is reeling under a proxy jihadi onslaught launched not only against Afghanistan but also against United States-NATO combine intent on stabilizing Afghanistan. The Taliban are the proxies.

The United States therefore is confronted with a fateful choice, namely to save Pakistan or Afghanistan. The United States cannot save both as was argued in this Author’s SAAG Paper No. 2585 dated 13 Feb 2008 entitled "United States Fateful Choices: Save Afghanistan or Save Pakistan".

The major conclusion that was offered was that if USA chooses to save Afghanistan it has the chance of saving Pakistan as a follow-up. On the other hand if USA elects to save Pakistan at the cost of Afghanistan it could face the danger of losing both to disorder and fragmentation.

That Afghanistan is a prized strategic asset for the United States is even recognized by Pakistan. It is for nothing that Pakistan has persisted in the last six years to undermine the United States control of Afghanistan by utilizing the Taliban insurgency.

It is for nothing that Pakistan has audaciously dared to militarily challenge the United States as a global super- power through asymmetric warfare utilizing the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban insurgents. This is an ample indicator as to high the stakes are for Pakistan in Afghanistan.

A stabilized Afghanistan will share many strategic convergences with the United States. Pakistan if ever stabilized would never share any strategic convergences with the United States and moreso now with a growing US-India strategic partnership and its strategic alliance with China.

The new bogey raised by Pakistan Army against the United States is that it is intent on circumcising the only nuclear weapons arsenal in the Islamic world with the clandestine assistance of Israel. The United States is painted as a Christian power at war with the Islamic World.

It is amazing therefore as to how US intellectuals and strategic analysts discover strategic convergences with Pakistan where all indicators indicate otherwise.

Afghanistan Can be Reclaimed by United States as a Moderate, Democratic Islamic State

American analysts overlook many of the following indicators which suggest that Afghanistan can be reclaimed by the United States as a stable moderate, democratic Islamic state (1) The Afghan people are not anti-American like those in Pakistan (2) The Afghan people especially the Northern Alliance assisted and facilitated the
Taliban regime change by the United States (3) Following displacement of Taliban from Afghanistan there were no large-scale uprisings by Afghans against the United States (4) Afghan people took part in democratic elections to elect US-favored President Karzai (5) The Taliban has had limited successes in Afghanistan only in areas where US-NATO military presence in scarce. The major deduction here being that the Afghan people do not favor the Taliban.

More importantly, Northern and Western Afghanistan distantly located from Pakistan are relatively more peaceful, stabilized and have developed in the last six years. Southern Afghanistan was always troubled and become more troubled in the last six years as in the initial years after 2002, the United States militarily neglected it in the vain hope that Pakistan Army would play its part in controlling the Taliban on its behalf in this region. Pakistan however treacherously did otherwise.

In the last six years of US-NATO assisted Karzai regime, appreciable progress and reconstruction has taken place including in the social sectors like Afghan women emerging once again in the liberal mould.

Afghanistan and the Afghan people are ready to assist the United State to stabilize Afghanistan and re-build it into a progressive state, only if the United States does not display weakening of resolve in this direction and stops exploring dangerous alternatives like exit strategies and dialogue with the much Afghan-hated Taliban. The Afghan people look to USA for steely resolve in eliminating the Taliban threat to Afghanistan.

US Intellectuals Must Disabuse Their Minds that Pakistan’s Sensitivities are Paramount in Solution of Afghanistan Conflict

This Author has argued in earlier Papers on Afghanistan that the most glaring contributory failure of United States policy and strategies in Afghanistan was due to (1) Linkage of US policies in Afghanistan with Pakistan (2) Over-importance given to Pakistan’s sensitivities over Afghanistan (3) Over reliance on Pakistan by United States for intelligence and logistics support.

Sadly, this trend still persists as if the United States would collapse in Afghanistan without Pakistan. This trend has led to the acceptance of a dialogue with Taliban in Saudi Arabia. This trend leads to avoidable pressures, at times counter productive in Indian’s eyes that India must give concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir and keep the peace process going Suggestion keep surfacing that Afghanistan must not cozy up to India in deference to Palestinian sensitivities.

Similarly, there are pressures on President Karzai to recognize the Durand Line and talk with the Taliban.

All this talk is utterly ridiculous and especially when it comes from personages who have held important official positions in the US establishment.

Illustrative of this line of thought and which persists till today was a joint articles by Karl Inderfurth former US Assistant Secretary of State and Dennis Kux former US diplomat in the Baltimore Sun in December 2006. Main points made were

• USA and key allies should prevail over Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line.
• Urged Washington to use influence with Karzai Government “to take greater account of Islamabad sensitivities in dealing with India”.
• “Even though India continues to provide generous economic assistance to Afghanistan, Kabul would be wise to address Pakistani concerns”.

Such wise men should have recommended otherwise, namely (1) USA should liquidate the Taliban from Quetta and its surroundings (2) US aid should be conditional on the same (3) US will militarily intervene in Pakistan to achieve the foregoing if Taliban continues to operate from Quetta and elsewhere (4) US will not enter into any dialogue with Taliban and nor will the Karzai regime.

In this connection one would like to quote the remarks of the Australian Defense Minister Fitzgibbon who was quoted in ‘The Australia’ December 17, 2007 that while NATO had been successfully “stomping on lots of ants, we have not been dealing with the ant’s nests”.

Need it be said that the ant’s nests are in Quetta area of Pakistan and it is only the Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban that are in FATA. Quetta Taliban are the major threat to Afghanistan.

Concluding Observations

Afghanistan is a prized strategic asset by virtue of its geo-political setting adjoining West Asia, Central Asia, China and South Asia. It is also of great strategic value to Russia.

With such a strategic setting it would be strategically disastrous for the United States to forego its strategic and political gains of the last six years in Afghanistan just to humour Pakistani sensitivities.

The United States must recognize that Pakistan aided by Saudi Arabia and with the tacit support of China, is the root of all strategic turbulence that afflicts Afghanistan. Pakistan therefore cannot be the part of the solution to stabilize Afghanistan.

The United States can only stabilize Afghanistan if America’s Afghan policies are delinked from Pakistan and America warns Pakistan of retribution if it persists in disruptive policies in Afghanistan through proxy use of the Taliban.

AFGHANISTAN & INDIAN MUSLIMS

In the wake of the recent upsurge in the activities of jihadi terrorists in the tribal belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, US military commanders have been talking of the arrival in Afghanistan via Pakistan of a large number of jihadis from Iraq, the Central Asian Republics, Chechnya in Russia and Turkey to step up the fight against the US and other NATO forces.

2. After an unidentified jihadi group (about 200 strong) attacked a US-commanded outpost in the Kunnar-Nuristan area of East Afghanistan and forced its withdrawal on July 13, 2008, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reported to have stated as follows: “We’re seeing a greater number of insurgents and foreign fighters flowing across the border with Pakistan, unmolested and unhindered. We simply must all do a better job of policing the border region and eliminating the safe havens, which serve today as launching pads for attacks on coalition forces. The group that launched the attack trained in safe havens in Pakistan. We see this threat accelerating, almost becoming a syndicate of different groups who heretofore had not worked closely together.” (The “News” of July 17 and the “Financial Times” of London of July 18)

3. In preparation for his visit to Washington DC later this week, accompanied by Asif Zardari, the co-Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), for talks with President George Bush, Yousef Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, was reported to have convened a special meeting with his senior officials to get himself briefed on the ground situation. Zardari was also reportedly present.

4. During the briefing, the officials were reported to have painted an alarming picture of the infiltration of foreigners into the tribal belt. They reportedly stated that the total number of foreign jihadis in Pakistan’s tribal belt could be as high as 8000. However, Rehman Malik, the Advisor on Internal Security, who has the rank of a Cabinet Minister, later estimated their number as about 1000, while talking to journalists.

5. The “News” of July 21, 2008, has carried a detailed report on this subject by Hamid Mir, the well-informed Pakistani journalist. There are some references to India in his report, which should be of great concern to our national security managers. These references are indicated below:

• “A few years ago, Pakistan was the safest route for foreign fighters to enter into Afghanistan but now they rarely use this old route. Most of them come as tourists and traders directly from Dushanbe, Baku, Istanbul, Dubai, Sharjah, Delhi and Frankfurt to Kabul by different airlines. Many Afghans in Kabul, Karachi, Dubai and Delhi are working for them as travel agents. It is also very easy to make a new Afghan passport for them in Kabul.
• “Two American-born Al-Qaeda operators Adam Gadhan alias Azzam al Amriki and Abu Ahmad alias Amir Butt are known in the Afghan Kunar province for making travel arrangements of these young and educated Muslims from the US, UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Canada and Australia.
• “It is also learnt that many fighters from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Bahrain, Libya, Iraq, Syria and some from India and Bangladesh prefer to stay in the warmer areas of southern Afghanistan which is a safe haven for the Taliban. The fighters from Morocco, Algeria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and from western countries like to stay in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Pakistani tribal areas bordering these areas. “

Afghanistan After 7 years

A bleeding stalemate on the ground in Afghanistan, a bleeding Pakistan tottering towards a possible collapse of the State and a total policy confusion in the corridors of power in Washington DC and other NATO capitals.

2. That has been the outcome of seven years of Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched by the US on October 7,2001, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist strikes by Al Qaeda in the US.

3.In Afghanistan, the US and the other NATO forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) control Kabul, the Capital, and other major towns and the Neo Taliban, resurrected from the pre-10/7 Taliban , controls the rural areas. Neither is in a position to dislodge the other from the areas controlled by it, but each is able to inflict bloody casualties on the other--- the US and other NATO forces through the use of heavy artillery and air strikes and the Taliban through weapons of Pakistani origin and through the inexhaustible flow of suicide terrorists.

4.In Pakistan, a Pakistan-version of the Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has arisen post-2002 and has been operating in tandem with the remnants of Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are now reported to be based in the North Waziristan area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is a coalition of jihadis, which has been operating in the FATA and in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)---- Afghan Pashtuns, Pakistani Pashtuns and Punjabis, Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Chechens of the 1980s vintage who had deserted from the Soviet Army, Uighurs of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China and Muslims of different ethnicities from the Muslim immigrant diaspora in the West----jihadis of Pakistani origin from the UK, Spain and Denmark, Turks and Uighurs from Germany and some others.

5. The post-2002 Pakistani version of the Taliban has proved to be even more deadly than its Afghan counterpart. The Pakistani Taliban carried out 56 attacks of suicide terrorism in the tribal and non tribal areas in 2007 and it has already carried out 40 so far this year. The number is just one-third of what the Afghan Taliban has carried out, but strategically more significant and deadly----- attacking carefully chosen military and intelligence targets in heavily-protected cities and cantonments----even in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army are located.

6. In the "News" of October 10, 2008, Dr Muzaffar Iqbal, a Pakistani analyst, wrote: "With an average of three suicide attacks per week in which at least thirty persons die, there will be 1,560 dead Pakistanis within a year. Add to this approximately 15 "extremists" being killed daily in the northern region, and we have a total of 7,035 dead. Further: for every hamlet, village, and hideout bombed, and with every "extremist" killed, we have an average of ten families displaced. So within a year, northern Pakistan will be a huge graveyard and there will be several thousand internally displaced persons living in makeshift camps in the rest of the country. In addition, there will be thousands of emotionally and mentally unstable persons available to anyone who can convince them that life is not worth living anymore, so come on and die for this or that cause. The net result will be an escalation of violence in all parts of the country and the spiral of violence and death reaching all corners of the country. How did we get here? "

7. A more difficult question engaging the attention of military commanders and policy-makers of the NATO countries is---- is a mid-course correction necessary and how to carry it out? Senior military officers of the NATO have started telling their policy-makers that the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan is unwinnable. Better make a deal with the Taliban to bring the war to an honourable end where there will be neither winners nor losers. However, they are not yet saying that the war against the Taliban in Pakistan is unwinnable. They think that if the Pakistan Army steadily maintains its present offensive in the tribal belt with discreet air support from US Drones (pilotless planes), the TTP can still be defeated.

8. It is a policy nightmare. What one has been seeing in the Pashtun tribal belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border is three wars in one---- against the Afghan Neo Taliban, against the Pakistani Taliban and against Al Qaeda. The war against the Afghan Taliban is not vital for the security of the West and for preventing new terrorist strikes in the West. No Afghan Pashtun has ever travelled outside his country to indulge in an act of terrorism in foreign territory. The Afghan Pashtuns, who never indulged in suicide terrorism in the past, look upon their present fight against the US and other NATO forces and their wave of suicide terrorism as part of their resistance struggle against the occupation of their country by foreign forces. They are just not interested in another 9/11 in the US homeland or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.

9. The war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban is vital for the security of the rest of the world, including the US, other NATO countries, India, China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics. The tribals, whom the Pakistani Army used in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999, were brought from the FATA. Many of the jihadis, who had indulged in acts of terrorism in different parts of the world after 2001, were trained in the training camps of Al Qaeda and its allies in the FATA. If the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda are not defeated, the world will have to live constantly under the fear of another 9/11 or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.

10. Is it possible to reach a separate peace with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban? The US is in the forefront of the war against the Afghan Taliban. It can take a decision, whether to continue fighting or whether to reach a peace and, if so, under what terms.The outcome of the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban depends more on the sincerity and willingness of the Pakistani security forces to fight the war to the finish, with US assistance. It is the Pakistan Army, which has to be in the forefront of this war. It has been fighting sporadically and with varying spells of intensity, but the determination to win the war is not there.

11. Just as US officers have come to the conclusion that the war against the Afghan Taliban is unwinnable and hence calls for a mix of the military and political approaches, the Pakistani officers too are coming to the conclusion that the war against the TTP is unwinnable on the ground and hence a different approach is called for in order to protect their population and security forces from the wave of suicide terrorism.

12. Is it possible to make peace with the Taliban on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border without weakening the war against the FATA-based Al Qaeda? With whome to negotiate? On the Afghan side, there are two vintages of the Taliban---the pre 10/7 vintage, which consists essentially of the political advisers of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir, before 10/7 and the post-2002 vintage which consists of the remnants of the pre-10/7 commanders such as Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serjuddin and the new commanders who have come to the fore in the recent fighting. The recent interactions between the representatives of the Government of Hamid Karzai and the Taliban under the auspices of the King of Saudi Arabia in Saudi Arabia during September were essentially with the Taliban of the pre-10/7 vintage.

13. Among those who reportedly attended the dinner were Mullah Muhammad Ghaus, a former Foreign Minister under the Taliban Government, Abdel Hakim Mujahed, former unofficial Taliban representative in the United Nations, Abdul Salaam Hashimi, former director of finance of the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, a former Deputy Minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, another former Foreign Minister, and Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaif, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan. The influence of these leaders on Mulla Omar was limited even before 10/7. Before 10/7, the Saudi Intelligence had repeatedly tried through them to persuade Mulla Omar to hand over bin Laden to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid an American military strike. They could not succeed. Some of them were either captured by the Americans or surrendered to them after the war began and were in US custody for some months before they were released. They are, therefore, viewed with suspicion by the Taliban commanders.

14. Moreover, the US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because they are not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders want one when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistan side of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistani security forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving its objective?

15.Gen . David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces in Iraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command. In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge between the secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of Al Qaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sides of the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the former Baathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters, were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which strongly unite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam is going to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have two common objectives--- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and the proclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long as these objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separate peace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.

16. Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden, Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the ground situation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US should focus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of Op Enduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective.

US & INDIAN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON AFGHANISTAN

Convergence of national security interests led the United States and India to a shared endeavor to displace the Taliban regime from Afghanistan in 2002 and thereafter underwrite the process of its emergence as a democratic, progressive and moderate Islamic state.

Since 2002, the United States and India have invested in Afghanistan’s political future in terms of security and economic reconstruction. The United States focused along with NATO Forces on military operations to liquidate the continuing and still existing resurgent Taliban onslaughts to ensure security and stability in Afghanistan. India’s involvement in the economic reconstruction and restoration of infrastructure, communications, connectivity, power generation, administration and the social sectors has been massive amounting to over US $ 1 billion in Afghanistan.

The overall central strategic objectives in Afghanistan of United States and India were two fold (1) Afghanistan should emerge as a democratic, progressive and stable state, and more importantly (2) Afghanistan should never ever become a Talibanised state and an epicenter of global terrorism. Nothing has happened to warrant a change in these joint strategic objectives.

Taliban of all hues, harbored, aided ad abetted by Pakistan continue to be the central instrument which challenges this shared US-India endeavor to reclaim Afghanistan. Challenging the might of US & NATO Forces by asymmetrical warfare it has claimed hundreds of lives of US & NATO soldiers securing peace in Afghanistan.

Taliban egged-on by Pakistan has attacked India’s reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and killed Indian engineers and technicians engaged in these projects.

Taliban’s central message in these strategies for the United States and India is that both should get out of Afghanistan. It is not the message of the Afghan people who hate the Taliban for their medieval Islamic brutalization of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2002. It is the message of the Taliban on behalf of its masters, i.e. Pakistan.

Pakistan has never invested in Afghanistan’s political future or its stability and security, ever since its inception in 1947. Pakistan continues to view Afghanistan as the legatee overlord after British withdrawal and serve Pakistan as its strategic backyard. The history of Pak-Afghan relations is replete with its continuous efforts by Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan.

Pakistan never realized that the manufacturing of 9/11 Islamic Jihadi onslaught on mainland USA in the ISI Jihadi factories in Taliban Afghanistan would bring about United States forceful military intervention in Afghanistan, displace its proxy Taliban regime in Kabul and deprive Pakistan of its strategic backyard in Afghanistan.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the fall of Taliban regime in Kabul due to US military intervention, Pakistan implemented a three-pronged strategy (1) Overtly, a façade of assisting United States in its global war on terrorism (2) Covertly, putting into effect a resurgent Taliban asymmetric warfare against US & NATO Forces in control of Afghanistan (3) By attrition over a period of time inducing strategic fatigue in US & NATO resolve and prompting their exit.

Reverting back to the present, what is noticeable are three main trends, namely (1) United States officially shows no signs of strategic fatigue and is revising its strategies in Afghanistan (2) Indian Prime Minister even after the devastating major suicide attack on the Indian Embassy, engineered by Pakistan’s ISI (US official assertion publicly declared) that India will continue its reconstruction presence in Afghanistan, and (3) Within NATO, Britain more noticeably has exhibited strategic fatigue and advocated initiatives along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for dialogue with the Taliban.

The dangers of strategic fatigue in Afghanistan stand vividly discussed in this Author’s SAAG Paper No. 2902 dated 29 Oct 2008 entitled “Afghanistan: United States/NATO Strategic Fatigue Spawns Dangerous Alternatives”.

This Paper brought out that the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan through such advocacy of partial power sharing in Kabul by the “moderate” Taliban ( an unholy interpretation of the Taliban) would be disastrous for United States global standing. Also was brought out that “US Intellectuals Must Disabuse Their Minds that Pakistan’s Sensitivities are Paramount in Solution of Afghanistan Conflict”.

The last named is a dangerous trend which has picked up more steam in the United States policy analysis circles. Some excerpts of this line of thinking are listed in the Annexure to this Paper.

Pakistan-orchestrated line of thinking in the United States briefly runs as follows (1) Pakistan is hampered in extending full support to United States in Afghanistan because of its strategic insecurities emanating from India (2) At the heart of Pakistan’s strategic insecurities is the unresolved issue of Kashmir (3) United States should pressurize India to compromise on Kashmir to enable Pakistan to effectively cooperate with USA in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's linkage of Kashmir with Afghanistan is only a blackmail attempt sensing that with strategic fatigue setting in policy advisory circles, Pakistan could reap rewards from USA on Kashmir or if nothing else cause a cleavage in the US-India Strategic Partnership.

The United States needs to arrest and officially refute such tenuous thinking in its policy advisory groups. Implicit in this is the danger of a serious disconnect emerging in US-India strategic perceptions on Afghanistan and a greater danger of impacting adversely on the overall evolution of the US-India Strategic Partnership, still on the making.

Some perspectives not covered in this Author’s above referred Paper are offered for pondering over now as follows:

• India Has Legitimate National Security Interests in Afghanistan.
• Taliban Incorporation in Power-Sharing in Kabul Will be Opposed by Other Stake-holders in Afghanistan
• United States Must Recognize that Afghanistan is Not Iraq

India Has Legitimate National Security Interests in Afghanistan

The following points need to be made in this connection (1) India’s legitimate national security interests in Afghanistan pre-date United States involvement in Afghanistan (2) India’s national security interests have acquired heightened salience with its emergence as the regional power in South Asia and its ascendancy towards global power status (3) India’s national security interests today extend far beyond South Asian confines and a stable and secure Afghanistan, free of radical influences, on the immediate periphery of South Asia on the West, is an important pivot for India’s national security.

Surely, neither US officialdom or its intellectual circles can dispute India’s national security interests in Afghanistan for today they are no longer Pak-centric but an extension of its growing power.

The United States needs to review its Pak-centric South-West Asia perspectives and recognize the reality that Afghanistan as a democratic, progressive and moderate Islamic country in a strategic partnership with India as the regional power (and global power in the making) would together provide a strong bulwark of stability for South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf Region.

Should the United States not recognize this reality then it has to face harsh strategic realities (1) India will not sacrifice its national security interests in Afghanistan to facilitate United States’ assuaging of self-inflicted strategic insecurities of Pakistan (2) Kashmir would be “non-negotiable" for any Indian political dispensation in power and (3) US pressures in this direction could impact adversely on the evolving US-India Strategic Partnership.

Taliban Incorporation in Power-Sharing in Kabul Will be Opposed by Other Stake-holders in Afghanistan

India always opposed the Taliban regime and Taliban in Afghanistan – even when US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel was hobnobbing with them in Mazar-e-Sharif and advocating US diplomatic recognition of the Taliban – a move wisely dropped by her seniors.

Taliban is virulently anti-Indian in outlook and has been the nursery of Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir as it has been in Afghanistan. The Indian psyche stands strongly singed by the visuals of IC-814 (Indian Airlines) plane hijacking to Kandahar in Afghanistan depicting the Islamic Jihadi hijackers and other noted terrorists being spirited away by the Taliban to safe sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Does this not evoke memories in the United States of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar (along with their hierarchies), all master-minds of 9/11, being spirited away to Pakistan in 2002?

India is an important stake-holder in Afghanistan and would not look kindly on any British-Pak-Saudi efforts to bring back the Taliban in power in Kabul through a back-door entry, and pregnant with prospects of enlarging its hold in Kabul once established. The US establishment does not ponder over the latter perspectives when it seconds the British proposal reluctantly.

More importantly, there are other vital stake-holders in Afghanistan’s stability and who have consistently opposed the Taliban all along, namely, Russia and Iran. Russia and Iran can be expected to vehemently oppose the inclusion of Taliban of any hues in power sharing in Kabul. And if USA persists on such a course, then one can expect the “Great Game” to return to Afghanistan, to the detriment of US national security interests.

Can the United States forget that US military intervention in Afghanistan was made successful with the tacit support of Russia and Iran.

The only other stake-holder left in Afghanistan is China and China would whole-heartedly support Pakistan's position and of the Taliban with which regime it had strong linkages.

United States Must Recognize that Afghanistan is Not Iraq

General Petraeus assuming command of US Central Command after a successful tenure in Iraq carries inherent dangers of repeating the Iraqi experiment in Afghanistan. Afghanistan geo-politically, geo-strategically and geographically in terms of terrain configuration is vastly different from Iraq.

Afghanistan therefore presents political and military challenges vastly different and vastly complex than in Iraq. It is also challenging in terms of application of US military power as in Iraq armored and mechanized warfare was a force multiplier. In Afghanistan reliance will have to be on heli-borne operations in the vast open space of this nation.

More significantly, the United States with a rapid military surge coupled with the manipulation of Sunni tribals could engineer a workable exit strategy from Iraq. Even in Iraq there is no exit of US Forces till 2011.

Other than forsaking its vital national security interests in Greater South West Asia by an “exit from Afghanistan at any cost," the United States is in for a long, long military haul in Afghanistan. And for this it will require to double the Afghan National Army at its own costs as unlike Iraq, there are no oil revenues flowing in for the same.

In such an extended and open-ended US involvement in Afghanistan, the United States could count handsomely on only one stake-holder and that is India. And that too because India like the United States has vital national security interests in Afghanistan. and both enjoy a strategic convergence there without any competing interests.

Concluding Observations

Pakistan’s diabolical attempts to engineer a hasty exit of United States and India from Afghanistan through the playing of the “Taliban Card” coupled with that card spawning advocacy of dangerous alternatives by the US policy establishment (under British pressure) carries in it the dangers of a serious disconnect emerging in US-India strategic perspectives on Afghanistan.

India cannot be expected to sacrifice its national security interests in Afghanistan, which are comprehensive and not Pak-centric, to facilitate the United States assuaging Pakistan’s strategic insecurities.

Should the United States deviate from its strategic congruencies with India on Afghanistan, then India would have been left with no other alternatives but to explore other options to protect her legitimate national security interests in Afghanistan.

United States and India today share strategic convergences on a vast array of strategic challenges in the meeting of which India can play a sizeable part. The United States should be mindful that neither by word or deed a disconnect takes place in US-India strategic perspectives, least of all Afghanistan.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)

ANNEXURE

SELECTED EXCERPTS

The Strategic Challenge in Pakistan Afghan Hinterland by Michael Schuer, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 15, Issue 30 dated August 12, 2008

• “The assumption based on the error that two nations can have identical interests had led the West to allow any and all nations to play a role in Afghanistan of their own choosing, a policy that will ultimately help undo Western interests there”.
• “The best example of the destructiveness of the “we’re all in this together” policy is, the role India is being allowed to play in Afghanistan."
• Commenting on why the Indian Embassy was bombed in Kabul and why it took so long in coming, he said “To ask that question would have to recognize that the United States and NATO have allowed their Kabul surrogate President Hamid Karzai and the Indian Government to use their supposedly selfless project of Afghan reconstruction as a tool with which to destroy one of the historic tenets of Pakistan’s national security (having a Pro-Pakistan, Islamist and Pashtun dominated Afghan Government).

Behind The Indian Embassy Bombing, Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic, August 1, 2008

• “The Karzai Government is openly and brazenly strengthening its ties with India and allowed Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. It has kept alive the possibility of inviting India to help train the new Afghan Army.”
• “Karzai’s open alliance with India is a casus belli for ISI” (Pakistan Army’s intelligence agency)
• “Only by assuaging the ISIs fears while allowing India’s rightful place in Kabul, can we get more cooperation from Pakistan to fight extremism”.
• “Pakistan is far more threatened by Talibanization than the US is but victory will require deft diplomacy including alliances with some Taliban elements against others.”

Bruce Riedel, Earlier President Clintons Security Advisor and now with President-elect Obama’s team

• “Pakistan should not be pressurized because its security establishment believes that it is threatened by US-India-Afghan alliance to dismember Pakistan.”
• “Pakistan’s military command continues to believe the two nation theory and wants Kashmir to be incorporated into the South Asian homeland for Muslim. To this extent, Afghanistan, they say is within Pakistan’s security perimeter.”
• “Strategic fatigue has set in” (in the US and NATO Policy establishment.

Foreign Affairs Journal: Essay on Afghanistan by Barry Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

• "Pakistan cannot be pressurised"
• "Pakistan feels that it faces both a US-Afghanistan-India alliance and a separate Russia-Iran alliance each aimed at undermining Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan an dismembering the Pakistani state."
• "Pakistan's legitimate sources of insecurity need to be addressed while increasing opposition to its disruptive activities."
• "Promote dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir issue."

Sri Lankan Issue

A respected Lankan religious leader (of a religion representing both the Tamil and Sinhalese community) recently made a telling statement. He said “to our utter shame and despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the Sri Lankan Nation has collectively signaled that the well being of the majority towers above the rights, dignity and safety of the Tamils” (ie the minority)…
What he meant in laymen’s terms is that the country’s leaders (spurred on by the majority community) view the Majority Sinhalese opinion more important than the minority opinion.

I wish this was wrong, but sadly, this statement has hit the nail on the head. Look at the proof.

a) Mahinda Rajapakse’s Presidential Campaign centered on a unitary state (which a Majority of the Sinhalese wants, while a majority of the moderate Tamils yearn for fair devolution) and he (MR) won.
b) Now even the UNP has shifted stance in order to garner more Sinhala votes and grab power, thereby taking away another option from the already limited options of the minority Tamils, who largely comprise of moderates.
c) The JVP and the JHU are trying to force a solution down the throat of the Tamils which the Sinhalese will be happy with, but the Tamils don’t find digestible.
d) Eelam War IV has begun. While this war is against the LTTE and not against the Tamils, it is the Tamil community that suffers the most from it. The Governments stated ultimate goal of Eelam War IV? To force a unitary solution on the country unopposed.

Also, despite screaming to the contrary, nobody (neither the government nor the LTTE) are coming up with a proposal of fair power devolution. Both sides are just avoiding the actual solution by blaming each other. (The LTTE is not even trying to come up with some sort of proposal!!) If you look at the situation in a detached manner, the LTTE has once again reiterated it’s commitment for a separate Eelam, while the Tissa Witarana led APRC is stumbling and falling in the dark in its search for a proposal on Devolution. And besides, even if the APRC does finally come up with some form of proposals, we can expect it to lose credibility because -

a) The UNP (which is one of the main political parties in the island) has not given its’ input to these proposals. And seeing the politics the UNP plays, the Green party would probably oppose those proposals (even if they were any good) just to gain some political mileage.
b) Likewise, the JVP, the TNA and the JHU which are third forces in parliament have not contributed to it.
c) More importantly, these proposals will more or less reflect the majority Sinhala opinion, and basically try to appease the majority Sinhalese than to offer a dignified and just solution to the minority Tamils. (Who, by the way, no leader seems to want to offer dignity and justice to)

This religious leader put it in a nutshell when he also said “From the side of the South there seems to be a frustrating game of double standards of flaunting power sharing as the democratic face to good governance and then shooting down any and all constructive proposals by imposing impossible pre-conditions. It is now obvious that this is a feet dragging exercise so that more extreme agendas could fall into place”.

Which leaves the minority with no (or limited) options for a noble solution. So what do they do? It seems to me the only alternate option the minority Tamils have is to support Prabhakaran until the Sinhala majority is forced to offer a fair and just solution. (Which all the intellectuals say is devolution of power close to, if not is - Federal) This (funnily) sounds similar to the policy meted out by Mahinda Rajapakse - who keeps declaring that the government’s military action is to force the Tigers to accept a political solution and give up the call for a separate state. In other words both sides are militarily trying to force a solution down each others throat.

So the government (which as President Rajapakse rightly stated has been given a unitary mandate by the majority Sinhalese and not the Tamils) and the LTTE (whose priority is the uncompromising retention of its own power base) will engage in a war until either one of these entities succeeds.

Which basically leaves the conflict riddled Tamil community on the lurch.

Meanwhile, in the day to day existence of Lankan lives, Tamils have to undergo more hardships than the Sinhala community. (Which the Sinhala community doesn’t seem to accept) In the case of abductions, killings and detentions, statistics show that it is a vast majority of Tamils who undergo this shame, while the Government is choosing to declare that there are no such indignities occurring. While this writer agrees that the LTTE and its propaganda minions are exaggerating the actual situation, it is unfair (on the Tamils especially) for the Government to turn a blind eye on these abuses on Tamil dignity and say that all is good and just at home. Up to date, nobody has been bought to book on the spate of abductions and killings. (Of course a former Air Force officer called Nishantha Gajanayake was allegedly arrested, but this was done after the opposition UNP exposed him. Which does not say much for the investigative powers of the police. Maybe the UNP – which has been a largely unsuccessful opposition - should give up their role in politics and replace the Islands defunct police force!)

Meanwhile, whenever a person is stopped at a checkpoint and his/her identity card states that he/she is Tamil, they are instantly looked upon with suspicion. To prove this, look at the recent statement made by the police when giving reasons to the Mt. Lavinia Chief Magistrate to detain a tabloid journalist (one Arthur Wamanan). When giving reasons for the arrest and detention of this reporter, the CID had put forward one reason that this individual is a Tamil! (This is apart from the fact that he was arrested on hearsay). So this example clearly shows that the Islands police and security forces are instantly suspicious when a Tamil name comes into the equation.

Therefore, Tamils will be detained merely on their ethnicity. Ridiculous! (Thankfully, the chief magistrate had reprimanded the cops for this line of thinking. This is another example of the Judiciary stepping in and acting proactively in the absence of fair, just and humble politikkas)
While a military victory here and a military victory there will garner a few drops of lifeblood for the political survival of the rulers (the Government and the LTTE), these are just short term respites. What about a long term solution which is just and dignified (dignity being the key word here) for all communities? The way things are going right now, it seems that whatever solution the country seems to be approaching is going to be just and dignified for the Majority. Not for the minority.

Plea to Mahinda Rajapakse – The fate of the Tamils lie in your hands. Not Prabhakaran’s. Yours is a responsibility which is greater than pleasing the Majority. You have created a unique opportunity to defeat the LTTE militarily and give the Tamils justice and dignity. Do not isolate the Tamils by scuttling a dignified proposal of Devolution. Because if you do so, something similar to the LTTE will once again raise its head from the ranks of the young and war affected Tamils - Even if you defeat the Tigers. The majority of the Tamils already live in peace and harmony amongst the Sinhalese. However, it is dignity that they lack in Sri Lanka. They want the same rights and privileges that the Sinhalese have. They want to be able to show their ID card at a checkpoint and proudly say that they are Sri Lankan Tamils and not be looked upon with suspicion. They don’t want to be called ‘Para Demalu’ by racists. If you deny them this right, they have no option but to fight for their dignity. You would do the same if you were in their shoes. Do not push them towards this state of affairs. After all, it was you who promised a dignified peace. Make sure it’s a dignified peace for all, and not just dignity for the majority of the people who voted for you.

Plea to the Tamil Community – Embrace the largely democratic system which is in place in the South, because only through Democracy will a just and dignified solution be born. In this regard, please bring forth a strong and democratic Tamil leader from your moderate ranks to the fore and give him/her unstinted support to fight for a just and dignified peace through the Democratic mainstream. Bring forth a fair and just leader with a voice and a brain (brains are what the Tamils have been historically famous for) that will match and parry (Democratically and peacefully) the larger than life Sinhala leaders into conceding justice and dignity for the Tamils. This is the only way for our beautiful country to get out of this mess.

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/8028

Pakistan's Sharif deports Nawaz Sharif

This article was written by MK Bhadrakumar.

Former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif's decision to end his seven-year exile as a wandering minstrel of democracy and go home has set the cat among the pigeons. Sharif has chosen the path of 'strategic defiance' of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. It is now make-or-break time for Musharraf. His 'deal' with another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, threatens to unravel even before it becomes operational. Equally, the efficacy of the American blueprint for Pakistan's democratic transformation becomes doubtful.

What are Sharif's calculations? To be sure, neither the United States nor Britain could moderate Sharif's uncompromising stance against Musharraf. Sharif insists Musharraf must quit office. The mediatory missions by the Saudi Arabian and Lebanese ruling families have also proved futile.

Sharif is drawing strength from the realization that his sustained campaign against army rule has caught the imagination of the average Pakistani. A sure sign is that the perennial timeservers in Pakistani politics, the powerful Chaudhry clan ruling Punjab these past five years, have begun contacting Sharif in recent weeks seeking political accommodation. They have an uncanny knack for knowing which way the political wind is blowing. As many as 21 members of parliament belonging to the ruling party may have sent out 'feelers' to Sharif.

Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League that supports him have different takes on the 'deal' with Bhutto. Musharraf innately distrusts Bhutto. The army views her with distaste. She carries no clout with the Lahore establishment. She may well prove a burden that Musharraf can do without. But he has no choice in the matter as this 'deal' is what Washington wants.

The PML prefers the post-2002 alliance with the religious parties to continue. But Musharraf cannot countenance an open alliance with religious parties as that would mar his reformist image in Western capitals. Besides, Sharif is forging an alliance with some of the Islamic parties.

Musharraf sees Sharif as opportunistic, authoritarian, dangerously maneuvering, and incessantly plotting to extend his influence. There is no na�vet� about Musharraf. He knows he faces a crisis if there is a popular uprising. And Sharif is a skilful agitator, especially in the heartland province of Punjab, which accounts for 56 percent of Pakistan's population, and happens to be his political base.

Sharif introduces fluidity into the situation for Bhutto as well. She faces dissent within her Pakistan People's Party over the 'deal.' The dissidents regard the 'deal' to be a sell-out of PPP's ideology and principles. This raises question marks about the feasibility of the constitutional amendment that Musharraf seeks to ensure that his re-election as president is not reviewed in a court of law. An amendment requires two-thirds support of 229 votes in the 342-member parliament. The ruling coalition, its allies and Bhutto's PPP en bloc could mobilize 255 members of parliament.

But it is a close call, given the likelihood of defection to Sharif's camp by members of the ruling coalition. As many as 15 MPs belonging to the ruling party may abstain from voting. And these are early days. Sharif has carefully timed his return. He senses it is time to strike.

Sharif calculates that given the prevailing popular mood in Pakistan, he has a readymade anti-American, anti-Musharraf platform. He intends to call the general's bluff threatening to detain him. Once his juggernaut gets going from Punjab, it will become unstoppable. Sharif counts on the supreme court to ensure that a level playing field is available at the next general elections.

He doesn't think Musharraf any longer has the option of imposing emergency rule, as the courts will frustrate such a move. The only exit route for Musharraf will then be declaring martial law. But that is uncharted territory. No previous military dictator in Pakistan dared to take that route. Both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan walked away rather than ask troops to crush popular opposition.

Sharif, therefore, expects Musharraf to cave in and call an all-party conference for discussing the modalities of constituting an interim caretaker government pending elections. Given the public opinion and an increasingly assertive judiciary, this outcome no longer seems implausible.

The irony is that there are several reasons why Sharif ought to have been Washington's man in Islamabad. Sharif can handle the menagerie of Islamists. His political pedigree dates back to the Zia-ul Haq era, and he knows best how to squeeze the jihadi culture out of Pakistan. Second, for the average Pakistani, Sharif is a 'desi neta'; he has gained in stature as a nationalist. That helps him leave behind the legacy of his misrule. Bhutto, on the other hand, is tarnished politically by her 'deal' with Musharraf as well as her proximity to the Americans.

She is yet to realise that her aura in Pakistan is turning out to be very different from her aura in America or Britain. Sharif is also genuinely pro-market and is friendly to large capital. He has taken care not to be branded as 'pro-American,' but he isn't reflexively opposed to American interests either. For him, modernization is something independent of 'Americanisation.' Indeed, despite his conservative rhetoric, Sharif has a proven record as a pragmatist.

Yet, if Washington has opted for Bhutto, the considerations were obvious. Sharif will refuse to be a participant in America's 'war on terror.' He understands America is the primary issue in Pakistan. He has sized up that the public expects him to be the marker of the beginning for Pakistan's 'post-American era,' no matter what his own gut instincts tell him. Least of all, Sharif's experience with Washington during his last term as prime minister was far from happy.

In other words, Sharif is good for globalisation, but can be a liability for the 'war on terror.' He may be good for Pakistan, but will be an unreliable ally for the present US administration with such weighty agenda toward Iran and Afghanistan. On balance, Washington decided to play safe. Bhutto, in comparison, will never create a faus pax for American interests. Besides, Sharif happens to be locked in a fierce blood feud with Musharraf. From Washington's perspective, Musharraf's continuance in power is non-negotiable. The bar of democracy shall be lowered to that end.

But no matter what Washington prescribed for Pakistan, the genie of democracy has leapt out of the bottle. Musharraf's re-election looks fanciful. There may be no other way of saving the regime except by imposing harsh emergency rule or even martial law.

This article was written by M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian ambassador, headed the Pakistan Division at the Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1990s. http://in.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/10mkb.htm

What kind of future awaits Bangladesh?

The interim government in Bangladesh has hit another landmark, arresting one of the country's most charismatic politicians, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. This arrest brings to an end weeks of speculation about the government's intentions. There were clear signs that the government was preparing to jail Ms Zia, with investigations into financial dealings during her last term in office.
But speculation was also rife that the government wanted to do a deal with her - particularly after she was allowed to clear outstanding income taxes dating back years, rather than face charges for tax evasion.

The Anti-Corruption Commission's decision to bite the bullet and file a specific charge triggered diverse reactions. This has been done to harass her politically, to prevent her from carrying out her political functions. It was no secret that the government was preparing to act against her. In fact, many were asking why Khaleda Zia had not been arrested yet.

The government is presenting the arrest as a clear demonstration that the drive against corruption is transparent and neutral. For her part, Ms Zia believes the charges and arrests are designed to "destroy" her family and remove them from Bangladesh's political scene. She was arrested along with her younger son Arafat. Her elder son Tarique is already in jail facing corruption charges. There is little doubt that the military-led government wants to see an end to the Zia family's domination of Bangladesh politics.

Ms Zia has led her Bangladesh Nationalist Party - or - BNP unchallenged for nearly 25 years. Tarique emerged as heir apparent after the party's stunning electoral triumph in 2001. Tarique's rapid rise to become the most powerful man in the country - with tales of rampant corruption associated with his band of cronies - alienated many inside the party. Other sections of society were also angered by what they saw as a brazen attempt to install and perpetuate a dynasty.

The government has not made any secret of its desire to force the two largest political parties, the BNP and its main rival the Awami League, to carry out extensive internal reforms. The central plank of this reform process is the so-called "minus-two solution" - the BNP without the Zia family, and the Awami League without its iconic leader Sheikh Hasina. The first, ill-conceived efforts to get rid of the two women failed miserably last May, when both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia successfully fought off clumsy attempts by the government to send them into exile. Now the government seems back on course, pursuing the same agenda.

Ms Hasina was put in jail in July and charged in a series of extortion and corruption cases. Now with Ms Zia in jail, the government's confidence level is likely to reach a new high. That confidence reached rock bottom towards the end of August, when students at Dhaka University were joined by thousands of others in three days of street demonstrations. The violent protests and clashes with police and army led the government to impose a curfew and arrest university teachers. There were allegations of widespread assaults on students and torture of people in custody.

The only thing which remains to be seen is how independently and fairly the special corruption courts are allowed to function. This has been one of the major factors in eroding public support for the government over the past few months.

The big question in Bangladesh now is - what kind of future does the government have in mind?

Happy Teacher's Day

(Teacher's Day in India is a tribute to the hard work that is put by the teacher all year long to educate a child. In India, teacher day is celebrated on 5th of September. Indian Teachers Day is dedicated to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who was a staunch believer of education and was one of the greatest scholars and teachers of all times, apart from being the President of India. As a tribute to this great teacher, his birthday is observed as Teachers Day in India.)

Teachers mold the lives that they influence. Lessons learned from teachers remain with their students throughout life. Teachers that break down barriers and reach into the souls of the students that they are responsible for do not get the recognition or gratitude they have earned. Many teachers are exhausted from their workload and responsibilities. Teachers need encouragement and support from the community to feel that their devotion to students is appreciated.

If you ever have come across one teacher in all your student life, which has changed your life and your way of thinking for the better, you have been blessed. Thankfully I have had several such opportunities. Right from pre-primary school right up to the University, I have benefited from teachers who have gone beyond their call of duty, to mould me and my fellow students into better human beings, first and foremost, and then to instill in us a sense of purpose for life, that at a young age seems all too ambiguous.

These teachers went above the regular lectures, exams; viva’s and juries, and made me realize that education is something much more than what is contained in the printed text book.

I consider education to be one of the nobler professions, akin to medicine. Teachers, who spend their lives teaching kids, do more than just teach. They help mould the future of our communities, cities and countries.

I shall forever be thankful to all those wonderful teachers, who have enriched my life. To name a few would not be fair, because there are too many to name. And this is a day about all the teachers who have worked silently, under great stress and pressure to produce responsible and capable citizens of this world.

Hansen Fellowship Report (submitted by me)

The way a society is organized can create both the root causes of conflict and the conditions in which it's likely to occur. Indeed, conflicts of all kinds most frequently arise when people feel threatened - regardless of whether the threat is real. It is harder to soothe and reassure people when they are frightened or angry. My understanding of conflict situation stems from the fact that almost all the South Asian countries are facing with.

The case of Bangladesh suggests to me that conflicts arise when people are competing for the same resources (such as territory, natural resources, jobs and income, housing) when they aren't fairly distributed or when there aren't enough to go round.

The case of Pakistan and Nepal suggests to me that conflicts arise when the people are unhappy with how they are governed. The most common conflicts occur when a particular group wants to be independent from a central government, or when their viewpoint isn't represented in the government, or when the government oppresses them and doesn't respect or meet their basic needs.

The case of Sri Lanka suggests to me that ethnic differences can cause conflict, or be made to cause it. Again, people's ethnicity gives them a sense of identity and belonging, and it is threats to this sense, which can cause violent responses, just as individuals may lash out with angry words or gestures when they feel threatened.

The case of India suggests to me that conflicts arise when people's beliefs clash. Religious and political views are particularly sensitive, because people often depend on these for a sense of identity and belonging. Sometimes a religious/political group being attacked causes the conflict; sometimes it is because the group is eager to spread a particular belief and even enforce it on others. Some leaders may aggravate religious and political differences as part of their tactics for keeping or gaining power.

Since the tragedy of India's partition, maintaining peace and harmony amongst India's diverse communities has often been a very tall order. Hardest of all has been the task of managing hostilities between Hindu and Muslim communities, and preventing the outbreaks of religious vendetta that shatter the lives of the unfortunate victims. The articulation of the two-nation theory and the creation of the state of Pakistan implied that so great was the animus between the two communities that it was virtually impossible for them to live together in peace in the same nation.

In contrast, for those concerned with the task of achieving peace in the Indian subcontinent, Hindu-Muslim unity has always been one of the essential pillars of progressive movement. The proxy-war in Kashmir, where agents of terror have infiltrated into the Jammu and Kashmir region and caused havoc for the local Indian people. Since 1990, there have been several massacres of villagers - particularly women and children. But rather than see these attacks as what they are - an assault on India's secular unity - people have begun to see these threats through the prism of religious sectarianism to destroy the peaceful lives of Hindus.

In large part, such a feeling of generalized hatred emerges from the inability to understand complex political realities. The Muslim-hating Hindu does not wish to see the subcontinent's difficulties outside the prism of Hindu-Muslim conflicts because the alternative is much more difficult to deal with. But the net effect of this within India is that the religious divide grows instead of shrinking. Rather than India uniting against it's myriad external threats, the Godhra massacre (in February 2002) caused a part of India to implode. Seething with hatred, a section of Gujarat's Hindus went on a retributive rampage - destroying homes, businesses and precious lives. Only further investigation will tell if there was any external involvement in the Godhra crime, but the reaction of Gujarat's militant Hindus has led to tremendous insecurity amongst India's Muslims and greatly weakened India's ability to act with resoluteness in the face of external threats. To that extent, it highlights serious weaknesses in the world-view of such Hindu-identified layers of Indian society. Communal clashes rarely happen out of the blue; invariably they result from catalytic incidents.

The preservation of peace and harmony requires prevention at all levels - in ensuring that inflammable incidents do not occur, and the reaction to them is immediately controlled. This may mean developing relationships and alliances with Hindus who are not entirely in sympathy or agreement with them on all issues, but nevertheless wish to live and let live.

Since the state apparatus is drawn from living and breathing individuals who may harbor all manner of prejudices and false notions, much more work in raising consciousness will also be necessary. For any set of social principles to be consistently implemented through the writ of a state, they must also win the trust and adherence of broad sections of the public. It is here that the role of the "secular" intelligentsia such us “Hansen Fellows” - whether it be in the universities or in the media becomes vital, and needs to be examined more closely.

I have seen from my own experience that many people find their identity and security in their cultural/religious group and its particular point of view - so clashes between different cultural/religious groups always lead to disputes that can easily turn violent. I have pondered upon, what if people learn to understand that differing cultures/religion are not inevitably a threat to each other? If only that happens then they will learn how to manage their differences co-operatively and peacefully.

One aspect of Religion/culture is particularly important: it can create language and behavior that excludes people, creating 'us/them', 'insider/outsider' situations and using language of discrimination, intolerance and hate. If people create a society that doesn't see 'difference' and 'diversity' as problems but as valuable for social growth, many causes of conflict disappear.

Certainly most people want to live in societies in which there is healthy conflict leading to change and progress - we are an evolving species - but in which this is achieved without fighting and killing. Most people would like it to be possible for individuals, groups and cultures to live together without violent conflict, though not resisting progress and constructive changes. Most of us would prefer our systems of law and order to be reasonable and open to reform and change, and certainly not imposed on us by force. Most of us would like a world in which human rights are respected, cultural differences are seen as enriching any society, and co-operative efforts are made to deal with problems of poverty, deprivation, injustice, and abuse of power.

Peace itself is a process in which nonviolent solutions to healthy conflict are repeatedly explored and developed in a co-operative and collaborative way.

Need for a Coalition:

I believe that there aren't yet enough skilled interveners, mediators, negotiators, peace-builders at work to help groups at conflict to solve their problems. I also learnt that those who are already at work are not yet a fully co-ordinated organisation. There are many different peace-building groups, many different approaches, and many different timescales. A coherent overall network with good communications is needed so that everyone knows what everyone else is doing.

This is where the idea of Hansen Coalition comes in. A coalition is an alliance of people or groups working together for a shared purpose. Political coalitions quickly encounter problems, because every member wants to lead. But social coalitions aren't interested in power: they work for the common good of everyone.

Where there is a strong network of strong relationships, conflict is less likely to recur. It means a coalition of interveners too: members of this young and exciting profession have a lot to communicate and a lot to learn from each other, all round the world. As they do, a 'culture of peace' can begin to grow and spread, crossing all boundaries and enriching all lives.

Undoubtedly, I am planning to utilize the coalition to find solutions to our perennial problems such as religious conflicts. I want my country to remain as a nation where respect for pluralism, for differences, for social variety is respected. No community should feel unsafe or unwanted. India does not belong to any single group of Indians, least of all to any group of religious extremists. It belongs to a mosaic of linguistically and culturally varied communities. As a Hansen Fellow I will leave no stone unturned in turning the fragile unity of India into something deeper and more enduring. There is an urgent need to create an environment where Indians can fight for a common good - for an inclusive vision that transcends religious frictions and divisions - that holds great promise for the vast majority.