A respected Lankan religious leader (of a religion representing both the Tamil and Sinhalese community) recently made a telling statement. He said “to our utter shame and despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the Sri Lankan Nation has collectively signaled that the well being of the majority towers above the rights, dignity and safety of the Tamils” (ie the minority)…
What he meant in laymen’s terms is that the country’s leaders (spurred on by the majority community) view the Majority Sinhalese opinion more important than the minority opinion.
I wish this was wrong, but sadly, this statement has hit the nail on the head. Look at the proof.
a) Mahinda Rajapakse’s Presidential Campaign centered on a unitary state (which a Majority of the Sinhalese wants, while a majority of the moderate Tamils yearn for fair devolution) and he (MR) won.
b) Now even the UNP has shifted stance in order to garner more Sinhala votes and grab power, thereby taking away another option from the already limited options of the minority Tamils, who largely comprise of moderates.
c) The JVP and the JHU are trying to force a solution down the throat of the Tamils which the Sinhalese will be happy with, but the Tamils don’t find digestible.
d) Eelam War IV has begun. While this war is against the LTTE and not against the Tamils, it is the Tamil community that suffers the most from it. The Governments stated ultimate goal of Eelam War IV? To force a unitary solution on the country unopposed.
Also, despite screaming to the contrary, nobody (neither the government nor the LTTE) are coming up with a proposal of fair power devolution. Both sides are just avoiding the actual solution by blaming each other. (The LTTE is not even trying to come up with some sort of proposal!!) If you look at the situation in a detached manner, the LTTE has once again reiterated it’s commitment for a separate Eelam, while the Tissa Witarana led APRC is stumbling and falling in the dark in its search for a proposal on Devolution. And besides, even if the APRC does finally come up with some form of proposals, we can expect it to lose credibility because -
a) The UNP (which is one of the main political parties in the island) has not given its’ input to these proposals. And seeing the politics the UNP plays, the Green party would probably oppose those proposals (even if they were any good) just to gain some political mileage.
b) Likewise, the JVP, the TNA and the JHU which are third forces in parliament have not contributed to it.
c) More importantly, these proposals will more or less reflect the majority Sinhala opinion, and basically try to appease the majority Sinhalese than to offer a dignified and just solution to the minority Tamils. (Who, by the way, no leader seems to want to offer dignity and justice to)
This religious leader put it in a nutshell when he also said “From the side of the South there seems to be a frustrating game of double standards of flaunting power sharing as the democratic face to good governance and then shooting down any and all constructive proposals by imposing impossible pre-conditions. It is now obvious that this is a feet dragging exercise so that more extreme agendas could fall into place”.
Which leaves the minority with no (or limited) options for a noble solution. So what do they do? It seems to me the only alternate option the minority Tamils have is to support Prabhakaran until the Sinhala majority is forced to offer a fair and just solution. (Which all the intellectuals say is devolution of power close to, if not is - Federal) This (funnily) sounds similar to the policy meted out by Mahinda Rajapakse - who keeps declaring that the government’s military action is to force the Tigers to accept a political solution and give up the call for a separate state. In other words both sides are militarily trying to force a solution down each others throat.
So the government (which as President Rajapakse rightly stated has been given a unitary mandate by the majority Sinhalese and not the Tamils) and the LTTE (whose priority is the uncompromising retention of its own power base) will engage in a war until either one of these entities succeeds.
Which basically leaves the conflict riddled Tamil community on the lurch.
Meanwhile, in the day to day existence of Lankan lives, Tamils have to undergo more hardships than the Sinhala community. (Which the Sinhala community doesn’t seem to accept) In the case of abductions, killings and detentions, statistics show that it is a vast majority of Tamils who undergo this shame, while the Government is choosing to declare that there are no such indignities occurring. While this writer agrees that the LTTE and its propaganda minions are exaggerating the actual situation, it is unfair (on the Tamils especially) for the Government to turn a blind eye on these abuses on Tamil dignity and say that all is good and just at home. Up to date, nobody has been bought to book on the spate of abductions and killings. (Of course a former Air Force officer called Nishantha Gajanayake was allegedly arrested, but this was done after the opposition UNP exposed him. Which does not say much for the investigative powers of the police. Maybe the UNP – which has been a largely unsuccessful opposition - should give up their role in politics and replace the Islands defunct police force!)
Meanwhile, whenever a person is stopped at a checkpoint and his/her identity card states that he/she is Tamil, they are instantly looked upon with suspicion. To prove this, look at the recent statement made by the police when giving reasons to the Mt. Lavinia Chief Magistrate to detain a tabloid journalist (one Arthur Wamanan). When giving reasons for the arrest and detention of this reporter, the CID had put forward one reason that this individual is a Tamil! (This is apart from the fact that he was arrested on hearsay). So this example clearly shows that the Islands police and security forces are instantly suspicious when a Tamil name comes into the equation.
Therefore, Tamils will be detained merely on their ethnicity. Ridiculous! (Thankfully, the chief magistrate had reprimanded the cops for this line of thinking. This is another example of the Judiciary stepping in and acting proactively in the absence of fair, just and humble politikkas)
While a military victory here and a military victory there will garner a few drops of lifeblood for the political survival of the rulers (the Government and the LTTE), these are just short term respites. What about a long term solution which is just and dignified (dignity being the key word here) for all communities? The way things are going right now, it seems that whatever solution the country seems to be approaching is going to be just and dignified for the Majority. Not for the minority.
Plea to Mahinda Rajapakse – The fate of the Tamils lie in your hands. Not Prabhakaran’s. Yours is a responsibility which is greater than pleasing the Majority. You have created a unique opportunity to defeat the LTTE militarily and give the Tamils justice and dignity. Do not isolate the Tamils by scuttling a dignified proposal of Devolution. Because if you do so, something similar to the LTTE will once again raise its head from the ranks of the young and war affected Tamils - Even if you defeat the Tigers. The majority of the Tamils already live in peace and harmony amongst the Sinhalese. However, it is dignity that they lack in Sri Lanka. They want the same rights and privileges that the Sinhalese have. They want to be able to show their ID card at a checkpoint and proudly say that they are Sri Lankan Tamils and not be looked upon with suspicion. They don’t want to be called ‘Para Demalu’ by racists. If you deny them this right, they have no option but to fight for their dignity. You would do the same if you were in their shoes. Do not push them towards this state of affairs. After all, it was you who promised a dignified peace. Make sure it’s a dignified peace for all, and not just dignity for the majority of the people who voted for you.
Plea to the Tamil Community – Embrace the largely democratic system which is in place in the South, because only through Democracy will a just and dignified solution be born. In this regard, please bring forth a strong and democratic Tamil leader from your moderate ranks to the fore and give him/her unstinted support to fight for a just and dignified peace through the Democratic mainstream. Bring forth a fair and just leader with a voice and a brain (brains are what the Tamils have been historically famous for) that will match and parry (Democratically and peacefully) the larger than life Sinhala leaders into conceding justice and dignity for the Tamils. This is the only way for our beautiful country to get out of this mess.
http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/8028
Wednesday, November 07, 2007
Monday, September 10, 2007
Pakistan's Sharif deports Nawaz Sharif
This article was written by MK Bhadrakumar.
Former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif's decision to end his seven-year exile as a wandering minstrel of democracy and go home has set the cat among the pigeons. Sharif has chosen the path of 'strategic defiance' of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. It is now make-or-break time for Musharraf. His 'deal' with another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, threatens to unravel even before it becomes operational. Equally, the efficacy of the American blueprint for Pakistan's democratic transformation becomes doubtful.
What are Sharif's calculations? To be sure, neither the United States nor Britain could moderate Sharif's uncompromising stance against Musharraf. Sharif insists Musharraf must quit office. The mediatory missions by the Saudi Arabian and Lebanese ruling families have also proved futile.
Sharif is drawing strength from the realization that his sustained campaign against army rule has caught the imagination of the average Pakistani. A sure sign is that the perennial timeservers in Pakistani politics, the powerful Chaudhry clan ruling Punjab these past five years, have begun contacting Sharif in recent weeks seeking political accommodation. They have an uncanny knack for knowing which way the political wind is blowing. As many as 21 members of parliament belonging to the ruling party may have sent out 'feelers' to Sharif.
Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League that supports him have different takes on the 'deal' with Bhutto. Musharraf innately distrusts Bhutto. The army views her with distaste. She carries no clout with the Lahore establishment. She may well prove a burden that Musharraf can do without. But he has no choice in the matter as this 'deal' is what Washington wants.
The PML prefers the post-2002 alliance with the religious parties to continue. But Musharraf cannot countenance an open alliance with religious parties as that would mar his reformist image in Western capitals. Besides, Sharif is forging an alliance with some of the Islamic parties.
Musharraf sees Sharif as opportunistic, authoritarian, dangerously maneuvering, and incessantly plotting to extend his influence. There is no na�vet� about Musharraf. He knows he faces a crisis if there is a popular uprising. And Sharif is a skilful agitator, especially in the heartland province of Punjab, which accounts for 56 percent of Pakistan's population, and happens to be his political base.
Sharif introduces fluidity into the situation for Bhutto as well. She faces dissent within her Pakistan People's Party over the 'deal.' The dissidents regard the 'deal' to be a sell-out of PPP's ideology and principles. This raises question marks about the feasibility of the constitutional amendment that Musharraf seeks to ensure that his re-election as president is not reviewed in a court of law. An amendment requires two-thirds support of 229 votes in the 342-member parliament. The ruling coalition, its allies and Bhutto's PPP en bloc could mobilize 255 members of parliament.
But it is a close call, given the likelihood of defection to Sharif's camp by members of the ruling coalition. As many as 15 MPs belonging to the ruling party may abstain from voting. And these are early days. Sharif has carefully timed his return. He senses it is time to strike.
Sharif calculates that given the prevailing popular mood in Pakistan, he has a readymade anti-American, anti-Musharraf platform. He intends to call the general's bluff threatening to detain him. Once his juggernaut gets going from Punjab, it will become unstoppable. Sharif counts on the supreme court to ensure that a level playing field is available at the next general elections.
He doesn't think Musharraf any longer has the option of imposing emergency rule, as the courts will frustrate such a move. The only exit route for Musharraf will then be declaring martial law. But that is uncharted territory. No previous military dictator in Pakistan dared to take that route. Both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan walked away rather than ask troops to crush popular opposition.
Sharif, therefore, expects Musharraf to cave in and call an all-party conference for discussing the modalities of constituting an interim caretaker government pending elections. Given the public opinion and an increasingly assertive judiciary, this outcome no longer seems implausible.
The irony is that there are several reasons why Sharif ought to have been Washington's man in Islamabad. Sharif can handle the menagerie of Islamists. His political pedigree dates back to the Zia-ul Haq era, and he knows best how to squeeze the jihadi culture out of Pakistan. Second, for the average Pakistani, Sharif is a 'desi neta'; he has gained in stature as a nationalist. That helps him leave behind the legacy of his misrule. Bhutto, on the other hand, is tarnished politically by her 'deal' with Musharraf as well as her proximity to the Americans.
She is yet to realise that her aura in Pakistan is turning out to be very different from her aura in America or Britain. Sharif is also genuinely pro-market and is friendly to large capital. He has taken care not to be branded as 'pro-American,' but he isn't reflexively opposed to American interests either. For him, modernization is something independent of 'Americanisation.' Indeed, despite his conservative rhetoric, Sharif has a proven record as a pragmatist.
Yet, if Washington has opted for Bhutto, the considerations were obvious. Sharif will refuse to be a participant in America's 'war on terror.' He understands America is the primary issue in Pakistan. He has sized up that the public expects him to be the marker of the beginning for Pakistan's 'post-American era,' no matter what his own gut instincts tell him. Least of all, Sharif's experience with Washington during his last term as prime minister was far from happy.
In other words, Sharif is good for globalisation, but can be a liability for the 'war on terror.' He may be good for Pakistan, but will be an unreliable ally for the present US administration with such weighty agenda toward Iran and Afghanistan. On balance, Washington decided to play safe. Bhutto, in comparison, will never create a faus pax for American interests. Besides, Sharif happens to be locked in a fierce blood feud with Musharraf. From Washington's perspective, Musharraf's continuance in power is non-negotiable. The bar of democracy shall be lowered to that end.
But no matter what Washington prescribed for Pakistan, the genie of democracy has leapt out of the bottle. Musharraf's re-election looks fanciful. There may be no other way of saving the regime except by imposing harsh emergency rule or even martial law.
This article was written by M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian ambassador, headed the Pakistan Division at the Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1990s. http://in.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/10mkb.htm
Former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif's decision to end his seven-year exile as a wandering minstrel of democracy and go home has set the cat among the pigeons. Sharif has chosen the path of 'strategic defiance' of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. It is now make-or-break time for Musharraf. His 'deal' with another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, threatens to unravel even before it becomes operational. Equally, the efficacy of the American blueprint for Pakistan's democratic transformation becomes doubtful.
What are Sharif's calculations? To be sure, neither the United States nor Britain could moderate Sharif's uncompromising stance against Musharraf. Sharif insists Musharraf must quit office. The mediatory missions by the Saudi Arabian and Lebanese ruling families have also proved futile.
Sharif is drawing strength from the realization that his sustained campaign against army rule has caught the imagination of the average Pakistani. A sure sign is that the perennial timeservers in Pakistani politics, the powerful Chaudhry clan ruling Punjab these past five years, have begun contacting Sharif in recent weeks seeking political accommodation. They have an uncanny knack for knowing which way the political wind is blowing. As many as 21 members of parliament belonging to the ruling party may have sent out 'feelers' to Sharif.
Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League that supports him have different takes on the 'deal' with Bhutto. Musharraf innately distrusts Bhutto. The army views her with distaste. She carries no clout with the Lahore establishment. She may well prove a burden that Musharraf can do without. But he has no choice in the matter as this 'deal' is what Washington wants.
The PML prefers the post-2002 alliance with the religious parties to continue. But Musharraf cannot countenance an open alliance with religious parties as that would mar his reformist image in Western capitals. Besides, Sharif is forging an alliance with some of the Islamic parties.
Musharraf sees Sharif as opportunistic, authoritarian, dangerously maneuvering, and incessantly plotting to extend his influence. There is no na�vet� about Musharraf. He knows he faces a crisis if there is a popular uprising. And Sharif is a skilful agitator, especially in the heartland province of Punjab, which accounts for 56 percent of Pakistan's population, and happens to be his political base.
Sharif introduces fluidity into the situation for Bhutto as well. She faces dissent within her Pakistan People's Party over the 'deal.' The dissidents regard the 'deal' to be a sell-out of PPP's ideology and principles. This raises question marks about the feasibility of the constitutional amendment that Musharraf seeks to ensure that his re-election as president is not reviewed in a court of law. An amendment requires two-thirds support of 229 votes in the 342-member parliament. The ruling coalition, its allies and Bhutto's PPP en bloc could mobilize 255 members of parliament.
But it is a close call, given the likelihood of defection to Sharif's camp by members of the ruling coalition. As many as 15 MPs belonging to the ruling party may abstain from voting. And these are early days. Sharif has carefully timed his return. He senses it is time to strike.
Sharif calculates that given the prevailing popular mood in Pakistan, he has a readymade anti-American, anti-Musharraf platform. He intends to call the general's bluff threatening to detain him. Once his juggernaut gets going from Punjab, it will become unstoppable. Sharif counts on the supreme court to ensure that a level playing field is available at the next general elections.
He doesn't think Musharraf any longer has the option of imposing emergency rule, as the courts will frustrate such a move. The only exit route for Musharraf will then be declaring martial law. But that is uncharted territory. No previous military dictator in Pakistan dared to take that route. Both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan walked away rather than ask troops to crush popular opposition.
Sharif, therefore, expects Musharraf to cave in and call an all-party conference for discussing the modalities of constituting an interim caretaker government pending elections. Given the public opinion and an increasingly assertive judiciary, this outcome no longer seems implausible.
The irony is that there are several reasons why Sharif ought to have been Washington's man in Islamabad. Sharif can handle the menagerie of Islamists. His political pedigree dates back to the Zia-ul Haq era, and he knows best how to squeeze the jihadi culture out of Pakistan. Second, for the average Pakistani, Sharif is a 'desi neta'; he has gained in stature as a nationalist. That helps him leave behind the legacy of his misrule. Bhutto, on the other hand, is tarnished politically by her 'deal' with Musharraf as well as her proximity to the Americans.
She is yet to realise that her aura in Pakistan is turning out to be very different from her aura in America or Britain. Sharif is also genuinely pro-market and is friendly to large capital. He has taken care not to be branded as 'pro-American,' but he isn't reflexively opposed to American interests either. For him, modernization is something independent of 'Americanisation.' Indeed, despite his conservative rhetoric, Sharif has a proven record as a pragmatist.
Yet, if Washington has opted for Bhutto, the considerations were obvious. Sharif will refuse to be a participant in America's 'war on terror.' He understands America is the primary issue in Pakistan. He has sized up that the public expects him to be the marker of the beginning for Pakistan's 'post-American era,' no matter what his own gut instincts tell him. Least of all, Sharif's experience with Washington during his last term as prime minister was far from happy.
In other words, Sharif is good for globalisation, but can be a liability for the 'war on terror.' He may be good for Pakistan, but will be an unreliable ally for the present US administration with such weighty agenda toward Iran and Afghanistan. On balance, Washington decided to play safe. Bhutto, in comparison, will never create a faus pax for American interests. Besides, Sharif happens to be locked in a fierce blood feud with Musharraf. From Washington's perspective, Musharraf's continuance in power is non-negotiable. The bar of democracy shall be lowered to that end.
But no matter what Washington prescribed for Pakistan, the genie of democracy has leapt out of the bottle. Musharraf's re-election looks fanciful. There may be no other way of saving the regime except by imposing harsh emergency rule or even martial law.
This article was written by M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian ambassador, headed the Pakistan Division at the Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1990s. http://in.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/10mkb.htm
Sunday, September 09, 2007
What kind of future awaits Bangladesh?
The interim government in Bangladesh has hit another landmark, arresting one of the country's most charismatic politicians, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. This arrest brings to an end weeks of speculation about the government's intentions. There were clear signs that the government was preparing to jail Ms Zia, with investigations into financial dealings during her last term in office.
But speculation was also rife that the government wanted to do a deal with her - particularly after she was allowed to clear outstanding income taxes dating back years, rather than face charges for tax evasion.
The Anti-Corruption Commission's decision to bite the bullet and file a specific charge triggered diverse reactions. This has been done to harass her politically, to prevent her from carrying out her political functions. It was no secret that the government was preparing to act against her. In fact, many were asking why Khaleda Zia had not been arrested yet.
The government is presenting the arrest as a clear demonstration that the drive against corruption is transparent and neutral. For her part, Ms Zia believes the charges and arrests are designed to "destroy" her family and remove them from Bangladesh's political scene. She was arrested along with her younger son Arafat. Her elder son Tarique is already in jail facing corruption charges. There is little doubt that the military-led government wants to see an end to the Zia family's domination of Bangladesh politics.
Ms Zia has led her Bangladesh Nationalist Party - or - BNP unchallenged for nearly 25 years. Tarique emerged as heir apparent after the party's stunning electoral triumph in 2001. Tarique's rapid rise to become the most powerful man in the country - with tales of rampant corruption associated with his band of cronies - alienated many inside the party. Other sections of society were also angered by what they saw as a brazen attempt to install and perpetuate a dynasty.
The government has not made any secret of its desire to force the two largest political parties, the BNP and its main rival the Awami League, to carry out extensive internal reforms. The central plank of this reform process is the so-called "minus-two solution" - the BNP without the Zia family, and the Awami League without its iconic leader Sheikh Hasina. The first, ill-conceived efforts to get rid of the two women failed miserably last May, when both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia successfully fought off clumsy attempts by the government to send them into exile. Now the government seems back on course, pursuing the same agenda.
Ms Hasina was put in jail in July and charged in a series of extortion and corruption cases. Now with Ms Zia in jail, the government's confidence level is likely to reach a new high. That confidence reached rock bottom towards the end of August, when students at Dhaka University were joined by thousands of others in three days of street demonstrations. The violent protests and clashes with police and army led the government to impose a curfew and arrest university teachers. There were allegations of widespread assaults on students and torture of people in custody.
The only thing which remains to be seen is how independently and fairly the special corruption courts are allowed to function. This has been one of the major factors in eroding public support for the government over the past few months.
The big question in Bangladesh now is - what kind of future does the government have in mind?
But speculation was also rife that the government wanted to do a deal with her - particularly after she was allowed to clear outstanding income taxes dating back years, rather than face charges for tax evasion.
The Anti-Corruption Commission's decision to bite the bullet and file a specific charge triggered diverse reactions. This has been done to harass her politically, to prevent her from carrying out her political functions. It was no secret that the government was preparing to act against her. In fact, many were asking why Khaleda Zia had not been arrested yet.
The government is presenting the arrest as a clear demonstration that the drive against corruption is transparent and neutral. For her part, Ms Zia believes the charges and arrests are designed to "destroy" her family and remove them from Bangladesh's political scene. She was arrested along with her younger son Arafat. Her elder son Tarique is already in jail facing corruption charges. There is little doubt that the military-led government wants to see an end to the Zia family's domination of Bangladesh politics.
Ms Zia has led her Bangladesh Nationalist Party - or - BNP unchallenged for nearly 25 years. Tarique emerged as heir apparent after the party's stunning electoral triumph in 2001. Tarique's rapid rise to become the most powerful man in the country - with tales of rampant corruption associated with his band of cronies - alienated many inside the party. Other sections of society were also angered by what they saw as a brazen attempt to install and perpetuate a dynasty.
The government has not made any secret of its desire to force the two largest political parties, the BNP and its main rival the Awami League, to carry out extensive internal reforms. The central plank of this reform process is the so-called "minus-two solution" - the BNP without the Zia family, and the Awami League without its iconic leader Sheikh Hasina. The first, ill-conceived efforts to get rid of the two women failed miserably last May, when both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia successfully fought off clumsy attempts by the government to send them into exile. Now the government seems back on course, pursuing the same agenda.
Ms Hasina was put in jail in July and charged in a series of extortion and corruption cases. Now with Ms Zia in jail, the government's confidence level is likely to reach a new high. That confidence reached rock bottom towards the end of August, when students at Dhaka University were joined by thousands of others in three days of street demonstrations. The violent protests and clashes with police and army led the government to impose a curfew and arrest university teachers. There were allegations of widespread assaults on students and torture of people in custody.
The only thing which remains to be seen is how independently and fairly the special corruption courts are allowed to function. This has been one of the major factors in eroding public support for the government over the past few months.
The big question in Bangladesh now is - what kind of future does the government have in mind?
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Happy Teacher's Day
(Teacher's Day in India is a tribute to the hard work that is put by the teacher all year long to educate a child. In India, teacher day is celebrated on 5th of September. Indian Teachers Day is dedicated to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who was a staunch believer of education and was one of the greatest scholars and teachers of all times, apart from being the President of India. As a tribute to this great teacher, his birthday is observed as Teachers Day in India.)Teachers mold the lives that they influence. Lessons learned from teachers remain with their students throughout life. Teachers that break down barriers and reach into the souls of the students that they are responsible for do not get the recognition or gratitude they have earned. Many teachers are exhausted from their workload and responsibilities. Teachers need encouragement and support from the community to feel that their devotion to students is appreciated.
If you ever have come across one teacher in all your student life, which has changed your life and your way of thinking for the better, you have been blessed. Thankfully I have had several such opportunities. Right from pre-primary school right up to the University, I have benefited from teachers who have gone beyond their call of duty, to mould me and my fellow students into better human beings, first and foremost, and then to instill in us a sense of purpose for life, that at a young age seems all too ambiguous.
These teachers went above the regular lectures, exams; viva’s and juries, and made me realize that education is something much more than what is contained in the printed text book.
I consider education to be one of the nobler professions, akin to medicine. Teachers, who spend their lives teaching kids, do more than just teach. They help mould the future of our communities, cities and countries.
I shall forever be thankful to all those wonderful teachers, who have enriched my life. To name a few would not be fair, because there are too many to name. And this is a day about all the teachers who have worked silently, under great stress and pressure to produce responsible and capable citizens of this world.
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
Friday, August 10, 2007
Hansen Fellowship Report (submitted by me)
The way a society is organized can create both the root causes of conflict and the conditions in which it's likely to occur. Indeed, conflicts of all kinds most frequently arise when people feel threatened - regardless of whether the threat is real. It is harder to soothe and reassure people when they are frightened or angry. My understanding of conflict situation stems from the fact that almost all the South Asian countries are facing with.
The case of Bangladesh suggests to me that conflicts arise when people are competing for the same resources (such as territory, natural resources, jobs and income, housing) when they aren't fairly distributed or when there aren't enough to go round.
The case of Pakistan and Nepal suggests to me that conflicts arise when the people are unhappy with how they are governed. The most common conflicts occur when a particular group wants to be independent from a central government, or when their viewpoint isn't represented in the government, or when the government oppresses them and doesn't respect or meet their basic needs.
The case of Sri Lanka suggests to me that ethnic differences can cause conflict, or be made to cause it. Again, people's ethnicity gives them a sense of identity and belonging, and it is threats to this sense, which can cause violent responses, just as individuals may lash out with angry words or gestures when they feel threatened.
The case of India suggests to me that conflicts arise when people's beliefs clash. Religious and political views are particularly sensitive, because people often depend on these for a sense of identity and belonging. Sometimes a religious/political group being attacked causes the conflict; sometimes it is because the group is eager to spread a particular belief and even enforce it on others. Some leaders may aggravate religious and political differences as part of their tactics for keeping or gaining power.
Since the tragedy of India's partition, maintaining peace and harmony amongst India's diverse communities has often been a very tall order. Hardest of all has been the task of managing hostilities between Hindu and Muslim communities, and preventing the outbreaks of religious vendetta that shatter the lives of the unfortunate victims. The articulation of the two-nation theory and the creation of the state of Pakistan implied that so great was the animus between the two communities that it was virtually impossible for them to live together in peace in the same nation.
In contrast, for those concerned with the task of achieving peace in the Indian subcontinent, Hindu-Muslim unity has always been one of the essential pillars of progressive movement. The proxy-war in Kashmir, where agents of terror have infiltrated into the Jammu and Kashmir region and caused havoc for the local Indian people. Since 1990, there have been several massacres of villagers - particularly women and children. But rather than see these attacks as what they are - an assault on India's secular unity - people have begun to see these threats through the prism of religious sectarianism to destroy the peaceful lives of Hindus.
In large part, such a feeling of generalized hatred emerges from the inability to understand complex political realities. The Muslim-hating Hindu does not wish to see the subcontinent's difficulties outside the prism of Hindu-Muslim conflicts because the alternative is much more difficult to deal with. But the net effect of this within India is that the religious divide grows instead of shrinking. Rather than India uniting against it's myriad external threats, the Godhra massacre (in February 2002) caused a part of India to implode. Seething with hatred, a section of Gujarat's Hindus went on a retributive rampage - destroying homes, businesses and precious lives. Only further investigation will tell if there was any external involvement in the Godhra crime, but the reaction of Gujarat's militant Hindus has led to tremendous insecurity amongst India's Muslims and greatly weakened India's ability to act with resoluteness in the face of external threats. To that extent, it highlights serious weaknesses in the world-view of such Hindu-identified layers of Indian society. Communal clashes rarely happen out of the blue; invariably they result from catalytic incidents.
The preservation of peace and harmony requires prevention at all levels - in ensuring that inflammable incidents do not occur, and the reaction to them is immediately controlled. This may mean developing relationships and alliances with Hindus who are not entirely in sympathy or agreement with them on all issues, but nevertheless wish to live and let live.
Since the state apparatus is drawn from living and breathing individuals who may harbor all manner of prejudices and false notions, much more work in raising consciousness will also be necessary. For any set of social principles to be consistently implemented through the writ of a state, they must also win the trust and adherence of broad sections of the public. It is here that the role of the "secular" intelligentsia such us “Hansen Fellows” - whether it be in the universities or in the media becomes vital, and needs to be examined more closely.
I have seen from my own experience that many people find their identity and security in their cultural/religious group and its particular point of view - so clashes between different cultural/religious groups always lead to disputes that can easily turn violent. I have pondered upon, what if people learn to understand that differing cultures/religion are not inevitably a threat to each other? If only that happens then they will learn how to manage their differences co-operatively and peacefully.
One aspect of Religion/culture is particularly important: it can create language and behavior that excludes people, creating 'us/them', 'insider/outsider' situations and using language of discrimination, intolerance and hate. If people create a society that doesn't see 'difference' and 'diversity' as problems but as valuable for social growth, many causes of conflict disappear.
Certainly most people want to live in societies in which there is healthy conflict leading to change and progress - we are an evolving species - but in which this is achieved without fighting and killing. Most people would like it to be possible for individuals, groups and cultures to live together without violent conflict, though not resisting progress and constructive changes. Most of us would prefer our systems of law and order to be reasonable and open to reform and change, and certainly not imposed on us by force. Most of us would like a world in which human rights are respected, cultural differences are seen as enriching any society, and co-operative efforts are made to deal with problems of poverty, deprivation, injustice, and abuse of power.
Peace itself is a process in which nonviolent solutions to healthy conflict are repeatedly explored and developed in a co-operative and collaborative way.
Need for a Coalition:
I believe that there aren't yet enough skilled interveners, mediators, negotiators, peace-builders at work to help groups at conflict to solve their problems. I also learnt that those who are already at work are not yet a fully co-ordinated organisation. There are many different peace-building groups, many different approaches, and many different timescales. A coherent overall network with good communications is needed so that everyone knows what everyone else is doing.
This is where the idea of Hansen Coalition comes in. A coalition is an alliance of people or groups working together for a shared purpose. Political coalitions quickly encounter problems, because every member wants to lead. But social coalitions aren't interested in power: they work for the common good of everyone.
Where there is a strong network of strong relationships, conflict is less likely to recur. It means a coalition of interveners too: members of this young and exciting profession have a lot to communicate and a lot to learn from each other, all round the world. As they do, a 'culture of peace' can begin to grow and spread, crossing all boundaries and enriching all lives.
Undoubtedly, I am planning to utilize the coalition to find solutions to our perennial problems such as religious conflicts. I want my country to remain as a nation where respect for pluralism, for differences, for social variety is respected. No community should feel unsafe or unwanted. India does not belong to any single group of Indians, least of all to any group of religious extremists. It belongs to a mosaic of linguistically and culturally varied communities. As a Hansen Fellow I will leave no stone unturned in turning the fragile unity of India into something deeper and more enduring. There is an urgent need to create an environment where Indians can fight for a common good - for an inclusive vision that transcends religious frictions and divisions - that holds great promise for the vast majority.
The case of Bangladesh suggests to me that conflicts arise when people are competing for the same resources (such as territory, natural resources, jobs and income, housing) when they aren't fairly distributed or when there aren't enough to go round.
The case of Pakistan and Nepal suggests to me that conflicts arise when the people are unhappy with how they are governed. The most common conflicts occur when a particular group wants to be independent from a central government, or when their viewpoint isn't represented in the government, or when the government oppresses them and doesn't respect or meet their basic needs.
The case of Sri Lanka suggests to me that ethnic differences can cause conflict, or be made to cause it. Again, people's ethnicity gives them a sense of identity and belonging, and it is threats to this sense, which can cause violent responses, just as individuals may lash out with angry words or gestures when they feel threatened.
The case of India suggests to me that conflicts arise when people's beliefs clash. Religious and political views are particularly sensitive, because people often depend on these for a sense of identity and belonging. Sometimes a religious/political group being attacked causes the conflict; sometimes it is because the group is eager to spread a particular belief and even enforce it on others. Some leaders may aggravate religious and political differences as part of their tactics for keeping or gaining power.
Since the tragedy of India's partition, maintaining peace and harmony amongst India's diverse communities has often been a very tall order. Hardest of all has been the task of managing hostilities between Hindu and Muslim communities, and preventing the outbreaks of religious vendetta that shatter the lives of the unfortunate victims. The articulation of the two-nation theory and the creation of the state of Pakistan implied that so great was the animus between the two communities that it was virtually impossible for them to live together in peace in the same nation.
In contrast, for those concerned with the task of achieving peace in the Indian subcontinent, Hindu-Muslim unity has always been one of the essential pillars of progressive movement. The proxy-war in Kashmir, where agents of terror have infiltrated into the Jammu and Kashmir region and caused havoc for the local Indian people. Since 1990, there have been several massacres of villagers - particularly women and children. But rather than see these attacks as what they are - an assault on India's secular unity - people have begun to see these threats through the prism of religious sectarianism to destroy the peaceful lives of Hindus.
In large part, such a feeling of generalized hatred emerges from the inability to understand complex political realities. The Muslim-hating Hindu does not wish to see the subcontinent's difficulties outside the prism of Hindu-Muslim conflicts because the alternative is much more difficult to deal with. But the net effect of this within India is that the religious divide grows instead of shrinking. Rather than India uniting against it's myriad external threats, the Godhra massacre (in February 2002) caused a part of India to implode. Seething with hatred, a section of Gujarat's Hindus went on a retributive rampage - destroying homes, businesses and precious lives. Only further investigation will tell if there was any external involvement in the Godhra crime, but the reaction of Gujarat's militant Hindus has led to tremendous insecurity amongst India's Muslims and greatly weakened India's ability to act with resoluteness in the face of external threats. To that extent, it highlights serious weaknesses in the world-view of such Hindu-identified layers of Indian society. Communal clashes rarely happen out of the blue; invariably they result from catalytic incidents.
The preservation of peace and harmony requires prevention at all levels - in ensuring that inflammable incidents do not occur, and the reaction to them is immediately controlled. This may mean developing relationships and alliances with Hindus who are not entirely in sympathy or agreement with them on all issues, but nevertheless wish to live and let live.
Since the state apparatus is drawn from living and breathing individuals who may harbor all manner of prejudices and false notions, much more work in raising consciousness will also be necessary. For any set of social principles to be consistently implemented through the writ of a state, they must also win the trust and adherence of broad sections of the public. It is here that the role of the "secular" intelligentsia such us “Hansen Fellows” - whether it be in the universities or in the media becomes vital, and needs to be examined more closely.
I have seen from my own experience that many people find their identity and security in their cultural/religious group and its particular point of view - so clashes between different cultural/religious groups always lead to disputes that can easily turn violent. I have pondered upon, what if people learn to understand that differing cultures/religion are not inevitably a threat to each other? If only that happens then they will learn how to manage their differences co-operatively and peacefully.
One aspect of Religion/culture is particularly important: it can create language and behavior that excludes people, creating 'us/them', 'insider/outsider' situations and using language of discrimination, intolerance and hate. If people create a society that doesn't see 'difference' and 'diversity' as problems but as valuable for social growth, many causes of conflict disappear.
Certainly most people want to live in societies in which there is healthy conflict leading to change and progress - we are an evolving species - but in which this is achieved without fighting and killing. Most people would like it to be possible for individuals, groups and cultures to live together without violent conflict, though not resisting progress and constructive changes. Most of us would prefer our systems of law and order to be reasonable and open to reform and change, and certainly not imposed on us by force. Most of us would like a world in which human rights are respected, cultural differences are seen as enriching any society, and co-operative efforts are made to deal with problems of poverty, deprivation, injustice, and abuse of power.
Peace itself is a process in which nonviolent solutions to healthy conflict are repeatedly explored and developed in a co-operative and collaborative way.
Need for a Coalition:
I believe that there aren't yet enough skilled interveners, mediators, negotiators, peace-builders at work to help groups at conflict to solve their problems. I also learnt that those who are already at work are not yet a fully co-ordinated organisation. There are many different peace-building groups, many different approaches, and many different timescales. A coherent overall network with good communications is needed so that everyone knows what everyone else is doing.
This is where the idea of Hansen Coalition comes in. A coalition is an alliance of people or groups working together for a shared purpose. Political coalitions quickly encounter problems, because every member wants to lead. But social coalitions aren't interested in power: they work for the common good of everyone.
Where there is a strong network of strong relationships, conflict is less likely to recur. It means a coalition of interveners too: members of this young and exciting profession have a lot to communicate and a lot to learn from each other, all round the world. As they do, a 'culture of peace' can begin to grow and spread, crossing all boundaries and enriching all lives.
Undoubtedly, I am planning to utilize the coalition to find solutions to our perennial problems such as religious conflicts. I want my country to remain as a nation where respect for pluralism, for differences, for social variety is respected. No community should feel unsafe or unwanted. India does not belong to any single group of Indians, least of all to any group of religious extremists. It belongs to a mosaic of linguistically and culturally varied communities. As a Hansen Fellow I will leave no stone unturned in turning the fragile unity of India into something deeper and more enduring. There is an urgent need to create an environment where Indians can fight for a common good - for an inclusive vision that transcends religious frictions and divisions - that holds great promise for the vast majority.
Wednesday, April 25, 2007
Political reforms in Bangladesh
The opposition parties of Bangladesh have been clamouring for political and electoral reforms for the last two years. For them, these reforms meant a neutral caretaker government and administration which can hold free and fair election. They thought that these reforms would be a tall order for the then Khaleda Zia government and the subsequent caretaker government appointed by her. Things however changed with the assumption of power by the Fakharuddin Ahmed as the head of the new caretaker government. He appears to be taking political reforms further than most opposition political parties had bargained for.
The political reform agenda suffered a setback when the caretaker government was forced to drop its plan of sending the chiefs of both political alliances in self-exile. The increasing domestic and political criticism prompted this decision. Following this Shaikh Hasina was allowed to return to the country. Her return also caused a minor breach of the emergency law when nearly 20,000 of her supporters lined up on both sides of the street to welcome her. This spontaneous turn out of thousands of people indicated that people did not like the decision of the government to exile Shaikh Hasina.
Sensing the changed situation, Khaleda Zia also dropped her plan to leave the country. To increase control over her party, she appointed her brother Major (retd) Sayeed Iskandar as party vice-chairman. This decision of Khaleda only added fuel to the already brewing rebellion inside the party.
The reform agenda was also affected when the Nobel peace prize winner and microcredit pioneer Muhammad Yunus announced that lack of support had forced him to pull out of a plan to create a new corruption-free political party. The government now faces the prospect of trying to reshape Bangladesh politics without any obvious challenger to former premiers Zia and Sheikh Hasina, who held power alternately since 1991.
A section thought that the failure of the caretaker government to exile former premiers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed - whose bitter rivalry has been blamed for plunging the country into political chaos – has chastened it. The caretaker government however is unwilling to give up the reform agenda so easily. It has asked the political parties in Bangladesh to ensure they practice internal democracy before the country holds free and fair elections.
The main thrust of the proposed reforms is to end the dynastic leadership in the parties. It will also change the way these leaders rule when they are in power. These reforms are proposed targeting former prime ministers Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia. Hasina is the daughter of independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Khaleda is the widow of former president General Ziaur Rahman.
The caretaker government also wants to strip the parties of their powerful and often militant student wings, which triggered immediate protests by Hasina's Awami League and Khaleda's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Both the BNP and Awami League bank heavily on the support of students and professional groups in this politically volatile south Asian country.
The government plans to implement democracy and financial transparency in the political parties. The Election Commission has proposed that parties register with it by submitting lists of their elected leaders. According to a senior Election Commission official, retired army Brigadier-General Sakhawat Hossain, these parties will have to complete elections to their central and grassroots committees in accordance with their constitutions before applying for registration. They will also have to disclose sources of funds. No political party would be allowed to contest national elections if it failed to register or complete the stipulated reforms.
The steps taken by the caretaker government for political reforms has encouraged several people within both BNP and the Awami League to discuss this hitherto forbidden issue. Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) Mayor Sadeque Hossain Khoka on May 10 stated that it was the best time to reduce the BNP chairperson's power to make unilateral decisions as the party is mature now. While talking about the appointment of BNP chief Khaleda Zia's brother Major (retd) Sayeed Iskandar as party vice-chairman, Khoka said time has come to reduce the unilateral power of the party chairperson. He said, "Such unilateral power was necessary when the party was formed, but now it is a mature party." He pointed out that the decentralization of power is necessary in BNP to make it a pro-people party.
Senior BNP leader M Saifur Rahman called for an end to 'dynastic' politics and said a number of mistakes committed by the last BNP-led four-party government brought on the present situation. In an interview to media on May 12, the former Finance and Planning Minister said the extension of the judges' retirement age and the appointment of the president as the head of the caretaker government were the reasons which brought on the present situation. Saifur said, "There should be an immediate end to family-centric politics." He criticised Khaleda's younger brother Major (retd) Saeed Iskandar's appointment as BNP’s vice-chairman.
The international community especially the EU member nations appear happy with the reform agenda of the caretaker government. Addressing a media conference marking the European Day in Dhaka the ambassadors of the EU member countries extended full support to the caretaker government in carrying out the electoral reforms and the anti-corruption drive. About the holding of the general election, British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury said they support the caretaker government for holding credible elections and also leaving behind a set of reforms and infrastructure to ensure the future elections are held with high standards and democracy here could be sustainable. He also did not agree that with the notion that Fakharuddin Ahmed’s is a military-backed government. He said it is a civilian caretaker government within the constitutional arrangement enjoying the support of the military, and so far, of the people.
The United States has however observed that Bangladesh and Bangladesh's democracy will face a setback if a non-elected government stays for an extended period of time. A spokesman for the State Department stressed that the caretaker government needs to move as quickly and effectively as it can to elections to continue the momentum of Bangladeshi democracy.
The caretaker government is also making conscious effort to create positive international opinion in favour of its reform agenda. With this objective it sent special envoy Farooq Sobhan to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Sobhan apprised the secretary general of various reform measures adopted by the caretaker government to hold the election before the end of 2008. He also met a number of UN officials.
Sobhan noted that the Election Commission is back on track and preparing a fresh voter list. He informed that both the chief adviser and the chief election commissioner have announced that the elections will be held before the end of 2008. The United Nations agreed to extend technical and financial assistance for holding a free and fair election in Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, both the Awami League (AL) and BNP have urged the caretaker government to lift restriction on internal politics soon so that they can have discussion with the Election Commission (EC) to expedite electoral and political reforms. The two parties said as soon as the government lifts the embargo they will hold discussion within their policymaking forums to finalise their views on EC's draft proposals for electoral reforms. They felt that it was impossible for them to assist the EC in carrying out the electoral reforms unless the ban was withdrawn. Earlier on April 4, the EC asked the government to lift the restriction allowing it to sit in dialogue with the political leaders to finalise the electoral reform proposals.
On the other hand, Fakharuddin Ahmed has defended his reliance on military help to run the country’s emergency government, and insisted that he is in charge. Speaking to BBC Fakhruddin Ahmed said that the military has only aided reforms, including a crackdown on corruption in which scores of political leaders have been arrested. He said, “The military is certainly backing the government but let me point out that this government was sworn in under a provision of the constitution…they are particularly providing very important services in maintaining law and order and combating crime and corruption.”
Reports have also indicated that both the government and the EC want the stalled ninth parliamentary election to be held much before the announced time frame of end 2008 if the EC can complete preparing the voter list. The Election Commission (EC) is looking for ways to prepare the voter list with photographs in the shortest possible time within the 18-month time frame. Bangladesh president Iajuddin Ahmed had also invited CEC ATM Shamsul Huda and two other election commissioners at Bangabhaban and asked them to make arrangements for holding the election in "shortest possible time".
The international and domestic pressure has made the caretaker government adopt a less hawkish approach to the reform agenda. But it has not given up. The government is trying to give a legal basis for reforms within political parties. This will create an infrastructure which will help democracy within the political parties. This is a laudable effort of the caretaker government. No doubt, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia have played a crucial role in Bangladesh politics. But the way they have governed the country has left a lot to be desired. The emergency rule has led to some introspection in these political parties. Still, it is not sufficient enough to bring any major change in the way these organizations have been functioning. The civil society of Bangladesh has also emphatically advocated the need for democratic change within the parties as a way of ensuring credible general elections and a stable democratic order. At the same time, the government must take some measures which would increase confidence of the political parties. For instance, the demand to remove the ban on indoor politics has been raised not only by the political parties but also by the EC. EC thinks that for any meaningful political reform, it must hold consultation with the stake holders i.e. political parties. This is not possible unless the ban on indoor politics is lifted.
Mani Shankar Aiyar's Speech - Economic Reforms made me completely Marxist
‘I was always Leftist. Economic reforms made me completely Marxist’
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/29112.html
In a speech at a CII meet, Mani Shankar Aiyar argued that policy is hijacked by a small elite. That the cabinet he belongs to is quite comfortable with this hijacking. That India’s system of governance is such that Rs 650 crore for village development is considered wasteful but Rs 7,000 crore for the Commonwealth Games is considered vital. The classes rule all the time, Aiyar says, the masses get a look-in every five years
A few weeks ago the newspapers reported that the number of Indian billionaires had exceeded the number of billionaires in Japan, and there was a considerable amount of self-congratulation on this. I understand from P. Sainath that we rank eighth in the world in the number of our millionaires. And we stand 126th on the Human Development Index. I am glad to report that last year we were 127th.
At this very fast rate of growth that we are now showing, we moved up from 127th to 126th position. This is the paradigm of our development process. In a democracy, every five years the masses determine who will rule this country. And they showed dramatically in the last elections that they knew how to keep their counsel and show who they wanted. We, my party and I, were the beneficiaries and we formed the government. Every five years, it is the masses who determine who will form the government. And in between those five years the classes determine what that government will do.
In determining what that government will do, the CII has played an extremely important role. I am not surprised, as that is its job. It represents industry, and therefore it argues for the interests of the industry. Industry has been enormously benefited by the processes of economic reform that we have seen in this country over the last 15 years or so. But the benefits of these reforms have gone so disproportionately to those who are the most passionate advocates of reforms that every five years we are given a slap in the face for having done what the CII regards as self-evidently the right thing for this country.
It is a sustainable economic proposition, because our numbers are so vast, that there are perhaps 10 million Indians who are just as rich as the richest equivalent segment anywhere in the world or in any group of countries. There are about fifty million Indians who really are extraordinarily well off. That’s the population of the UK.
But if you look at the 700 million Indians who are either not in the market or barely in the market, then the impact of the economic reforms process, which is so lauded by the CII, makes virtually no difference to their lives. That is why there is a complete disjunct between what the democratic processes are trying for in the short run and what those who have made an enormous success of our achievements in the last fifteen years deem to be, at least in the short run, their own requirements.
So when you talk of a nine point two per cent growth rate, it becomes a statistical abstraction: 0.2 per cent of our people are growing at 9.92 per cent per annum. But there is a very large number, I don’t know how many, whose growth rate is perhaps down to 0.2 per cent. But certainly, the number of those who are at the lower end of the growth sector is very much larger than those who are at the higher end.
Yet what happens when you have the budget? As an absolute ritual every finance minister (my colleague Chidambaram is no exception) will devote the first four or five pages of his budget speech to the bulk of India and there will then be several pages, including whole of part B, which deals perhaps with one or two per cent of our population. Almost the entire discussion that takes place at CII or CII-like forums, will be about Part B rather than Part A.
There are comfort levels that you get from statistics — for instance, suddenly Arun Shourie, announcing in the NDA government that our poverty rates have fallen from 35 per cent to 22 per cent. He did it by changing the basis on which you estimate poverty. You cannot compare apples and oranges. The next national sample survey has shown that our poverty levels have actually increased. Are we going to be mesmerised by these statistics or understand that 700 million of our people are poor?
So we have an Indira Awaas Yojana which will ensure that there will be a ‘jhuggi’ for every Indian round about the year 2200. We have the PM Gram Sadak Yojana which was supposed to complete all the gram sadak in seven years — we are in the eighth year. And where we are told that the education of 1000 may be covered, who knows only the education of 500 will be covered. And if you happen to be a tribal in Arunachal, you are told that because of your social custom you are to live in one hut atop a hill, we can’t provide you a road.
I was always something of a leftist. But I became a complete Marxist only after the economic reforms. Because I see the extent to which the most important conception of Marx — that the relationship of any given class with the means of production determines the superstructure — holds.
This ugly choice is placed before the government. An unequal choice, because you have organised yourself to say what you want to say but the others are only able to organise themselves and that too without speaking to each other in the fifth year when the elections take place. That is why this expression anti-incumbency, although the Oxford Dictionary says that it is a word belonging to the English language, is a peculiarly Indian phenomenon. Because everything that goes in the name of good governance like the economic reforms either does not touch the life of people or affect them at all.
We have seen what happened at Nandigram, we have seen what was happening at Singur and we have these propositions that say that SEZs are going to come and lakhs of hectares are going to be utilised for the good of the country. For what’s the syndrome in all this, it’s still ‘do bigha zameen’. The chap says that I want my one bigha of zameen to be reinstated, but you offer double the compensation and “baad mein dekha jayega”. You go to Hirakud, which is where Jawaharlal Nehru actually used the expression modern temples of India, and you ask what happened to the tribals who were driven out of there. Absolutely nobody knows.
Coming to the cabinet, you see what happens. The minute suggestions are made as to what would perhaps benefit the people and what would benefit the classes, the tendency is to say that our great achievement is 9.2 per cent growth. Our great achievement is that Indian industrialists are buying Arcelor and Corus. That Time magazine thinks we are a great power.
In these circumstances, when a proposal came before the government to spend Rs 648 crore on the Gram Nyaya department, we were solemnly informed by one of the most influential ministers in the government to remember that we are a poor country. I was delighted when the next day he was with me in a group of ministers and I reminded him of his remark and said in that case can we stop spending the Rs 7000 crore on the Commonwealth Games and he said, “No, no, that is an international commitment and a matter of national pride.” This national pride will of course blow up if you spend Rs 7000 crore on the Commonwealth Games. We will be on the cover of Time and Newsweek.
I have always wondered why this rate of growth and economic reforms process is dated to Manmohan Singh. Because actually it should be dated to L.K. Jha’s book Economic Strategy for the 80s. It is the decade in which we quickly recovered from agricultural depression and registered a double digit growth. At the beginning of the decade our biggest import was crude oil and after that it was edible oil. By the end of the decade we were exporters of several kinds of edible oil.
Why is it that Nehru became successful with his Hindu rate of growth? The reason is that the Hindu rate of growth was five times what our pre-Hindu rate of growth was. From 1914 to 1947, the figures of which are available, the rate of growth of the Indian economy was 0.72 per cent. And we got the Hindu rate of growth which was five times that and it made a difference to the people. The minute you had solid land reforms, the people had their ‘zameen’. That is what Mother India was all about. People felt that they were involved in the process. All the political talk was: gareeb ke liye ham kya kar sakte hain. Indira Gandhi matched it beautifully when the entire political spectrum joined hands against her by saying, “Woh kehte hain Indira hatao, hum kehte hain Garibi hatao.”
There is nobody so marginal in a government as the minister of Panchayati Raj. I count for nothing. Nothing! When I was the minister of petroleum, I used to walk surrounded by this media. I kept on telling them that petrol prices can do only three things — go up, go down or remain where they are. And it was all over the place. But try and get them to write two words about the 700 million Indians — absolutely impossible. And now with terrestrial television it is even worse. You have to be quarreling with your mother-in-law or hitting your daughter-in-law to be able to hit the headlines. It is impossible to get particularly the pink papers to focus on issues that affect the bulk of the people. And it is so easy to get them to focus on issues that are of high relevance to only one or two per cent of the people.
I believe the CII, if it is serious about the issue, should not be restricting itself to 25 minutes discussion before lunch but hold discussions for ten days and maybe something will come out of it.
Edited extracts from a speech at the CII Northern Region annual meeting 2006-07, New Delhi, April 4
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/29112.html
In a speech at a CII meet, Mani Shankar Aiyar argued that policy is hijacked by a small elite. That the cabinet he belongs to is quite comfortable with this hijacking. That India’s system of governance is such that Rs 650 crore for village development is considered wasteful but Rs 7,000 crore for the Commonwealth Games is considered vital. The classes rule all the time, Aiyar says, the masses get a look-in every five years
A few weeks ago the newspapers reported that the number of Indian billionaires had exceeded the number of billionaires in Japan, and there was a considerable amount of self-congratulation on this. I understand from P. Sainath that we rank eighth in the world in the number of our millionaires. And we stand 126th on the Human Development Index. I am glad to report that last year we were 127th.
At this very fast rate of growth that we are now showing, we moved up from 127th to 126th position. This is the paradigm of our development process. In a democracy, every five years the masses determine who will rule this country. And they showed dramatically in the last elections that they knew how to keep their counsel and show who they wanted. We, my party and I, were the beneficiaries and we formed the government. Every five years, it is the masses who determine who will form the government. And in between those five years the classes determine what that government will do.
In determining what that government will do, the CII has played an extremely important role. I am not surprised, as that is its job. It represents industry, and therefore it argues for the interests of the industry. Industry has been enormously benefited by the processes of economic reform that we have seen in this country over the last 15 years or so. But the benefits of these reforms have gone so disproportionately to those who are the most passionate advocates of reforms that every five years we are given a slap in the face for having done what the CII regards as self-evidently the right thing for this country.
It is a sustainable economic proposition, because our numbers are so vast, that there are perhaps 10 million Indians who are just as rich as the richest equivalent segment anywhere in the world or in any group of countries. There are about fifty million Indians who really are extraordinarily well off. That’s the population of the UK.
But if you look at the 700 million Indians who are either not in the market or barely in the market, then the impact of the economic reforms process, which is so lauded by the CII, makes virtually no difference to their lives. That is why there is a complete disjunct between what the democratic processes are trying for in the short run and what those who have made an enormous success of our achievements in the last fifteen years deem to be, at least in the short run, their own requirements.
So when you talk of a nine point two per cent growth rate, it becomes a statistical abstraction: 0.2 per cent of our people are growing at 9.92 per cent per annum. But there is a very large number, I don’t know how many, whose growth rate is perhaps down to 0.2 per cent. But certainly, the number of those who are at the lower end of the growth sector is very much larger than those who are at the higher end.
Yet what happens when you have the budget? As an absolute ritual every finance minister (my colleague Chidambaram is no exception) will devote the first four or five pages of his budget speech to the bulk of India and there will then be several pages, including whole of part B, which deals perhaps with one or two per cent of our population. Almost the entire discussion that takes place at CII or CII-like forums, will be about Part B rather than Part A.
There are comfort levels that you get from statistics — for instance, suddenly Arun Shourie, announcing in the NDA government that our poverty rates have fallen from 35 per cent to 22 per cent. He did it by changing the basis on which you estimate poverty. You cannot compare apples and oranges. The next national sample survey has shown that our poverty levels have actually increased. Are we going to be mesmerised by these statistics or understand that 700 million of our people are poor?
So we have an Indira Awaas Yojana which will ensure that there will be a ‘jhuggi’ for every Indian round about the year 2200. We have the PM Gram Sadak Yojana which was supposed to complete all the gram sadak in seven years — we are in the eighth year. And where we are told that the education of 1000 may be covered, who knows only the education of 500 will be covered. And if you happen to be a tribal in Arunachal, you are told that because of your social custom you are to live in one hut atop a hill, we can’t provide you a road.
I was always something of a leftist. But I became a complete Marxist only after the economic reforms. Because I see the extent to which the most important conception of Marx — that the relationship of any given class with the means of production determines the superstructure — holds.
This ugly choice is placed before the government. An unequal choice, because you have organised yourself to say what you want to say but the others are only able to organise themselves and that too without speaking to each other in the fifth year when the elections take place. That is why this expression anti-incumbency, although the Oxford Dictionary says that it is a word belonging to the English language, is a peculiarly Indian phenomenon. Because everything that goes in the name of good governance like the economic reforms either does not touch the life of people or affect them at all.
We have seen what happened at Nandigram, we have seen what was happening at Singur and we have these propositions that say that SEZs are going to come and lakhs of hectares are going to be utilised for the good of the country. For what’s the syndrome in all this, it’s still ‘do bigha zameen’. The chap says that I want my one bigha of zameen to be reinstated, but you offer double the compensation and “baad mein dekha jayega”. You go to Hirakud, which is where Jawaharlal Nehru actually used the expression modern temples of India, and you ask what happened to the tribals who were driven out of there. Absolutely nobody knows.
Coming to the cabinet, you see what happens. The minute suggestions are made as to what would perhaps benefit the people and what would benefit the classes, the tendency is to say that our great achievement is 9.2 per cent growth. Our great achievement is that Indian industrialists are buying Arcelor and Corus. That Time magazine thinks we are a great power.
In these circumstances, when a proposal came before the government to spend Rs 648 crore on the Gram Nyaya department, we were solemnly informed by one of the most influential ministers in the government to remember that we are a poor country. I was delighted when the next day he was with me in a group of ministers and I reminded him of his remark and said in that case can we stop spending the Rs 7000 crore on the Commonwealth Games and he said, “No, no, that is an international commitment and a matter of national pride.” This national pride will of course blow up if you spend Rs 7000 crore on the Commonwealth Games. We will be on the cover of Time and Newsweek.
I have always wondered why this rate of growth and economic reforms process is dated to Manmohan Singh. Because actually it should be dated to L.K. Jha’s book Economic Strategy for the 80s. It is the decade in which we quickly recovered from agricultural depression and registered a double digit growth. At the beginning of the decade our biggest import was crude oil and after that it was edible oil. By the end of the decade we were exporters of several kinds of edible oil.
Why is it that Nehru became successful with his Hindu rate of growth? The reason is that the Hindu rate of growth was five times what our pre-Hindu rate of growth was. From 1914 to 1947, the figures of which are available, the rate of growth of the Indian economy was 0.72 per cent. And we got the Hindu rate of growth which was five times that and it made a difference to the people. The minute you had solid land reforms, the people had their ‘zameen’. That is what Mother India was all about. People felt that they were involved in the process. All the political talk was: gareeb ke liye ham kya kar sakte hain. Indira Gandhi matched it beautifully when the entire political spectrum joined hands against her by saying, “Woh kehte hain Indira hatao, hum kehte hain Garibi hatao.”
There is nobody so marginal in a government as the minister of Panchayati Raj. I count for nothing. Nothing! When I was the minister of petroleum, I used to walk surrounded by this media. I kept on telling them that petrol prices can do only three things — go up, go down or remain where they are. And it was all over the place. But try and get them to write two words about the 700 million Indians — absolutely impossible. And now with terrestrial television it is even worse. You have to be quarreling with your mother-in-law or hitting your daughter-in-law to be able to hit the headlines. It is impossible to get particularly the pink papers to focus on issues that affect the bulk of the people. And it is so easy to get them to focus on issues that are of high relevance to only one or two per cent of the people.
I believe the CII, if it is serious about the issue, should not be restricting itself to 25 minutes discussion before lunch but hold discussions for ten days and maybe something will come out of it.
Edited extracts from a speech at the CII Northern Region annual meeting 2006-07, New Delhi, April 4
UN Peacebuilding Commission - A great initiative
“On 20 December 2005, upon the recommendations of the Secretary-General and his high level panel, the Security Council and the General Assembly ended a long phase of intergovernmental negotiations by adopting, by consensus, joint resolutions 1645 and 60/180 establishing a new UN Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission was tasked with addressing a critical gap within the UN and global system by providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst key actors. The Commission's 31 members were selected and it opened in June 2006, at which time the members elected a chair (Angola) and two vice-chairs (Norway and El Salvador). A Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office also have been launched to complement and support the work of the Commission. The PBC has held two rounds of "country-specific meetings" (on Sierra Leone and Burundi), and both countries have been recommended for support from the Fund. Civil society involvement in the PBC has been possible on an ad-hoc basis; formal mechanisms for civil society input have yet to be established.” http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/
Contrary to popular perception, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in the number of civil wars raging worldwide. This is primarily due to the ending of many existing wars through negotiated settlements.Yet, a startling and now oft-cited statistic paints a bleaker picture: over the same period, almost fifty percent of peace agreements have collapsed within five years, sending countries spiraling back into conflict.
A recent study concluded that countries that played host to post-conflict UN field missions since1988 have been just as likely to revert to war as countries where the UN had no presence. These statistics indicate that the opportunities presented by peace agreements are not being realized. When insufficient attention is paid to the needs of societies emerging from conflict, the consequences are severe for all concerned. The societies themselves risk poverty, population displacement, a reversal of development gains and renewed violence, sometimes at levels worse than the prior phase of war. If only two peace agreements of the 1990s – the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords for Rwanda – had been successfully implemented, some two million lives would have been saved. The effects on neighboring states can be severe as well, from refugee and arms flows, to long-term economic costs.
For the international community as a whole, weak post-war states can threaten global security by serving as attractive milieus for terrorists and transnational crime. Clearly, there is a collective stake in improving this record. The current international response in the aftermath of civil war suffers from several persistent weaknesses. Some of these are problems of commitment. Too often, there is alack of sustained political attention to post-conflict countries: after peace agreements are signed, or after a peacekeeping mission draws down, countries cease to attract the attention of the UN Security Council and donor governments. Related to this, there is difficulty in securing sustained and predictable financing for peacebuilding activities, which often occupy a grey area between peacekeeping and development. In particular, there is a lack of early funding, as donors are slow to mobilize, and there are gaps in funding for activities that donors consider sensitive, such as those linked to political reform or the country’s security architecture. Even when sufficient funds are pledged for peacebuilding, funding flows may be inconsistent and unpredictable, and recipient governments may be forced to navigate conflicting donor demands and priorities. An additional set of problems relates to the poor coordination of the international community in dealing with post-conflict environments.
The UN system is itself difficult to coordinate, and lacks agreed goals to which the entire system can work. There is a disconnect between perceptions in the capitals of member states and UN country teams in the field, which exacerbates the problems of political and financial support for even the strongest field operations. But the bigger picture involves a wider range of actors: the UN, the international financial institutions (IFIs), regional organizations, bilateral donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and, most importantly, the government and civil society in the country in question. These different actors often lack a shared strategic framework that outlines priorities, coordinates roles, and sequences activities to guide their operations.
In response to the resource shortfalls and organizational weaknesses of the international community in peacebuilding, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a new intergovernmental body at the United Nations. The PBC will be responsible for addressing a critical gap within the UN and global system by providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst key actors. This proposal was strongly promoted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and agreed by Member States at the September 2005 UN summit. In December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (UNSC) passed corresponding resolutions to establish the new organ as an intergovernmental advisory body, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office, which will be housed in the UN Secretariat and will serve as a focal point for UN peacebuilding efforts, and a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund.
The PBC will be composed of a 31-member Organizational Committee, as well as country-specific configurations to address specific country cases on the PBC’s agenda. Membership for the Organizational Committee will comprise seven Member States selected from the UNSC, seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSC), seven from the GA, and five each from a list of the ten largest troop contributors and financial donors. The Secretary-General and IFIs will be invited to participate in all meetings of the Organizational Committee. (Elections of the 31 members were completed on 16 May 2006and a full list may be found on the last page of this paper.) The country-specific configurations will include the country itself and, where relevant, neighboring states, regional and sub-regional organizations, financial, troop and civilian police contributors, the senior UN representative in the field and regional or international financial institutions. The PBC's agenda will be established by the Organizational Committee on the basis of requests for advice from the Security Council, ECOSOC or the GA in specific situations, member states on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict in cases in which the Security Council is not already seized, and the Secretary-General.
Second is to focus attention on there construction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery, bridging the gap between the immediate post-conflict phase and sustainable development. Third is to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN. The bulk of the PBC’s substantive work will be done on country-specific cases, and it is expected that the first case will be selected soon after the PBC’s inaugural meeting in late June 2006. Fourth, although the international community has a vital role to play, sustainability in peacebuilding ultimately relies on the work done by national governments and societies. Armed with the most rigorous analysis and best intentions, international actors have not succeeded where they have attempted to bypass national ownership or fail to understand local contexts. The key to a successful transition and sustainable results is early engagement with the functioning of the state, such that strategies are rooted in a shared compact between the society and the international community.
There is hope the PBC will provide further tools, guidance and resource mobilization and will actively engage allwho can contribute at the regional and sub-regional levels. However, although theresolutions establishing the PBC explicitly mention the involvement of regional and sub-regional actors in the country-specific committees, it is still not clear what form such involvement will take.
Contrary to popular perception, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in the number of civil wars raging worldwide. This is primarily due to the ending of many existing wars through negotiated settlements.Yet, a startling and now oft-cited statistic paints a bleaker picture: over the same period, almost fifty percent of peace agreements have collapsed within five years, sending countries spiraling back into conflict.
A recent study concluded that countries that played host to post-conflict UN field missions since1988 have been just as likely to revert to war as countries where the UN had no presence. These statistics indicate that the opportunities presented by peace agreements are not being realized. When insufficient attention is paid to the needs of societies emerging from conflict, the consequences are severe for all concerned. The societies themselves risk poverty, population displacement, a reversal of development gains and renewed violence, sometimes at levels worse than the prior phase of war. If only two peace agreements of the 1990s – the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords for Rwanda – had been successfully implemented, some two million lives would have been saved. The effects on neighboring states can be severe as well, from refugee and arms flows, to long-term economic costs.
For the international community as a whole, weak post-war states can threaten global security by serving as attractive milieus for terrorists and transnational crime. Clearly, there is a collective stake in improving this record. The current international response in the aftermath of civil war suffers from several persistent weaknesses. Some of these are problems of commitment. Too often, there is alack of sustained political attention to post-conflict countries: after peace agreements are signed, or after a peacekeeping mission draws down, countries cease to attract the attention of the UN Security Council and donor governments. Related to this, there is difficulty in securing sustained and predictable financing for peacebuilding activities, which often occupy a grey area between peacekeeping and development. In particular, there is a lack of early funding, as donors are slow to mobilize, and there are gaps in funding for activities that donors consider sensitive, such as those linked to political reform or the country’s security architecture. Even when sufficient funds are pledged for peacebuilding, funding flows may be inconsistent and unpredictable, and recipient governments may be forced to navigate conflicting donor demands and priorities. An additional set of problems relates to the poor coordination of the international community in dealing with post-conflict environments.
The UN system is itself difficult to coordinate, and lacks agreed goals to which the entire system can work. There is a disconnect between perceptions in the capitals of member states and UN country teams in the field, which exacerbates the problems of political and financial support for even the strongest field operations. But the bigger picture involves a wider range of actors: the UN, the international financial institutions (IFIs), regional organizations, bilateral donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and, most importantly, the government and civil society in the country in question. These different actors often lack a shared strategic framework that outlines priorities, coordinates roles, and sequences activities to guide their operations.
In response to the resource shortfalls and organizational weaknesses of the international community in peacebuilding, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a new intergovernmental body at the United Nations. The PBC will be responsible for addressing a critical gap within the UN and global system by providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst key actors. This proposal was strongly promoted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and agreed by Member States at the September 2005 UN summit. In December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (UNSC) passed corresponding resolutions to establish the new organ as an intergovernmental advisory body, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office, which will be housed in the UN Secretariat and will serve as a focal point for UN peacebuilding efforts, and a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund.
The PBC will be composed of a 31-member Organizational Committee, as well as country-specific configurations to address specific country cases on the PBC’s agenda. Membership for the Organizational Committee will comprise seven Member States selected from the UNSC, seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSC), seven from the GA, and five each from a list of the ten largest troop contributors and financial donors. The Secretary-General and IFIs will be invited to participate in all meetings of the Organizational Committee. (Elections of the 31 members were completed on 16 May 2006and a full list may be found on the last page of this paper.) The country-specific configurations will include the country itself and, where relevant, neighboring states, regional and sub-regional organizations, financial, troop and civilian police contributors, the senior UN representative in the field and regional or international financial institutions. The PBC's agenda will be established by the Organizational Committee on the basis of requests for advice from the Security Council, ECOSOC or the GA in specific situations, member states on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict in cases in which the Security Council is not already seized, and the Secretary-General.
Second is to focus attention on there construction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery, bridging the gap between the immediate post-conflict phase and sustainable development. Third is to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN. The bulk of the PBC’s substantive work will be done on country-specific cases, and it is expected that the first case will be selected soon after the PBC’s inaugural meeting in late June 2006. Fourth, although the international community has a vital role to play, sustainability in peacebuilding ultimately relies on the work done by national governments and societies. Armed with the most rigorous analysis and best intentions, international actors have not succeeded where they have attempted to bypass national ownership or fail to understand local contexts. The key to a successful transition and sustainable results is early engagement with the functioning of the state, such that strategies are rooted in a shared compact between the society and the international community.
There is hope the PBC will provide further tools, guidance and resource mobilization and will actively engage allwho can contribute at the regional and sub-regional levels. However, although theresolutions establishing the PBC explicitly mention the involvement of regional and sub-regional actors in the country-specific committees, it is still not clear what form such involvement will take.
The Recent Ethiopian-Somali conflict
A broader perspective shows many incidents of Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the 1948 settlement when the land was granted to Ethiopia. Somali disgruntlement with this decision has led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the hopes of taking control of the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia. This plan would have reunited the Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the Republic of Somalia. Without that, ethnic and political tensions have caused cross-border clashes over the years.
1960–1964 Border Dispute
1977–1978 Ogaden War
1982 August Border Clash
1998–2000 Cross-border warfare during the chaotic warlord-led era.
Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are not limited to the 20th–21st Centuries. Wars between Somalia, or its precursor Islamic states, and Ethiopia, stretch back to 16th century. For example, Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a 16th Century Islamic leader popular in Somali culture for his jihad against the Ethiopians during the rise of the Adal Sultanate.
Therefore, painful living history, oral and cultural traditions, long-standing ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay between the two nations and fuel the conflict.
The War in Somalia is an ongoing armed conflict involving largely Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces versus the Islamist militant umbrella group, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), and other affiliated militias for control of the country. The war officially began on December 21, 2006, when the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared "Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia". On December 24, Ethiopia stated it would actively combat the ICU.
Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, said Ethiopia entered hostilities because it faced a direct threat to its own borders. “Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation,” he said. “We are not trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia's internal affairs. We have only been forced by the circumstances.”
While it is true the ICU made threats to carry the war into Ethiopia, the circumstances referred to were in part due to prior Ethiopian actions. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia had begun months before, with the intercession of forces to support the establishment of the transitional government, and to support other regional governments considered more acceptable to Ethiopia.
The ICU, which controlled the coastal areas of southern Somalia, engaged in fighting with the forces of the Somali TFG, and the autonomous regional governments of Puntland and Galmudug, all of whom were backed by Ethiopian troops. The outbreak of heavy fighting began on December 20 with the Battle of Baidoa, after the lapse of a one-week deadline the ICU imposed on Ethiopia (on December 12) to withdraw from the nation. Ethiopia, however, refused to abandon its positions around the TFG interim capital at Baidoa. On December 29, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu relatively unopposed. Although not announced until later, a small number of U.S. special forces troops accompanied Ethiopian and TFG troops after the collapse and withdrawal of the ICU to give military advice and to track suspected al-Qaida fighters.
The two sides had traded war declarations and gun fire on several occasions before. Eastern African countries and international observers fear the Ethiopian offensive may lead to a regional war, involving Eritrea, a long-time enemy of Ethiopia, who Ethiopia claims to be a supporter of the ICU.
1960–1964 Border Dispute
1977–1978 Ogaden War
1982 August Border Clash
1998–2000 Cross-border warfare during the chaotic warlord-led era.
Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are not limited to the 20th–21st Centuries. Wars between Somalia, or its precursor Islamic states, and Ethiopia, stretch back to 16th century. For example, Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a 16th Century Islamic leader popular in Somali culture for his jihad against the Ethiopians during the rise of the Adal Sultanate.
Therefore, painful living history, oral and cultural traditions, long-standing ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay between the two nations and fuel the conflict.
The War in Somalia is an ongoing armed conflict involving largely Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces versus the Islamist militant umbrella group, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), and other affiliated militias for control of the country. The war officially began on December 21, 2006, when the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared "Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia". On December 24, Ethiopia stated it would actively combat the ICU.
Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, said Ethiopia entered hostilities because it faced a direct threat to its own borders. “Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation,” he said. “We are not trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia's internal affairs. We have only been forced by the circumstances.”
While it is true the ICU made threats to carry the war into Ethiopia, the circumstances referred to were in part due to prior Ethiopian actions. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia had begun months before, with the intercession of forces to support the establishment of the transitional government, and to support other regional governments considered more acceptable to Ethiopia.
The ICU, which controlled the coastal areas of southern Somalia, engaged in fighting with the forces of the Somali TFG, and the autonomous regional governments of Puntland and Galmudug, all of whom were backed by Ethiopian troops. The outbreak of heavy fighting began on December 20 with the Battle of Baidoa, after the lapse of a one-week deadline the ICU imposed on Ethiopia (on December 12) to withdraw from the nation. Ethiopia, however, refused to abandon its positions around the TFG interim capital at Baidoa. On December 29, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu relatively unopposed. Although not announced until later, a small number of U.S. special forces troops accompanied Ethiopian and TFG troops after the collapse and withdrawal of the ICU to give military advice and to track suspected al-Qaida fighters.
The two sides had traded war declarations and gun fire on several occasions before. Eastern African countries and international observers fear the Ethiopian offensive may lead to a regional war, involving Eritrea, a long-time enemy of Ethiopia, who Ethiopia claims to be a supporter of the ICU.
Indo-Bangladesh Relations
India which has been making effort to improve relationship with its neighbours in the spirit of SAARC, now wanted to bring a ‘positive uptrend’ in its bilateral relationship with Bangladesh. This intention of India was shown during the last SAARC summit, when it unilaterally decided to give certain benefits to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the region. Bangladesh was one of the obvious beneficiaries of this decision. Otherwise also, India wanted to put its relationship with Bangladesh on a strong footing. This was not possible without dealing with some of the issues which have acted as major irritants in the bilateral relationships. To remove these irritants and to give a positive thrust to bilateral relations, Indian foreign secretary, Shiva Shankar Menon visited Bangladesh from June 24 to June 26, 2007. Another main objective of the visit was to gauge the change in political situation after the postponement of January 22 elections.
India and Bangladesh had agreed to hold secretary-level talks annually, but flagging Dhaka-New Delhi relations turned the meetings into a biennial affair, held alternately in Dhaka in 2003 and in New Delhi in 2005. However, Bangladesh Foreign Adviser Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during their meeting in April on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in New Delhi promised regular secretary-level talks as part of a "new upward trajectory" in Dhaka-New Delhi relations. The recent meeting between Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain and Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was result of this.
India has been very clear in its approach towards the military backed caretaker government of Bangladesh headed by Fakharuddin Ahmed. This government displayed friendly attitude towards India unlike some of the previous governments that tried to capitalize by creating anti-India feeling among the Bangladeshi people. In contrast, certain steps taken by the caretaker government have arrested the continuous decline in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Though this government has put democracy on hold, so far it has not tried to throttle it. In fact, the steps taken by it appear to be taken with the intention to strengthen democracy in Bangladesh by purging the system of some of the evil practices which mainstream political parties have adopted since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised during the 14th SAARC Summit that India would accommodate duty-free access of products of the LDCs in the SAARC region, including Bangladesh, by December 2007. India now wanted to put into practice this promise. Bangladesh has been claiming for a long time that its exports to India were suffering because of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers. To remove these alleged ‘non-tariff barriers’ Dhaka and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to standardise their quality controls for certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems. Representatives from the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) and an Indian External Affairs Ministry official representing the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) signed the MoU. This step is likely to satisfy a long-pending demand of Bangladesh which thinks that it will help the country to expand its market in India.
Bangladesh has also demanded the removal of para-tariff barriers, which it claims raises the price of Bangladeshi exports in India due to Indian customs surcharges, additional charges, internal taxes and charges levied on imports, and decreased customs valuation. India has agreed to provide Bangladeshi goods with duty-free access to its market "in phases" by December 31. The next meeting of the Joint Working Group on Trade will attempt to sort out how to reduce the number of goods on India's "sensitive lists" protected from the duty-free arrangement. Both sides also discussed greater tariff cuts, coordinated development of land customs stations, establishing "border haats" and greater Indian investment into Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi side displayed a mature response to the cumulative trade gap of $7-8 billion with New Delhi. Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain said, "It will not happen overnight...I am sure we will reach a point where Bangladesh exports to India will increase." However, Bangladesh is drawing up its list of exportable items for the duty-free access. How far these steps will go to reduce the huge trade deficit Bangladesh has with India remains to be seen.
Sharing of Security Information
Both sides have also agreed to share security information regarding cross-border crimes and look to accelerate resolutions on border and water-resources sharing. The joint statement signed at the end of the meeting reads, "The two sides emphasised the need for enhanced security cooperation, particularly information sharing between the authorities concerned." The details of expanding security cooperation are likely to be discussed in the upcoming meeting of the home secretaries of the two countries. Of significance is the understanding forged to share intelligence information on cross border crimes. This could lead to enhanced security cooperation between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sharing security information, Menon said, "I think our securities are linked. We have a common security interest. Criminals, insurgents, terrorists--if any of these elements seek sanctuary, then it doesn't help either India or Bangladesh. We are both determined to work against this."
Issue of Support to Terrorism
Use of Bangladeshi territory by the insurgents and terrorists has been a sore point in the bilateral relationship of India and Bangladesh. During the recent meeting India wanted the military-backed interim government to dismantle the Islamic religious schools near the common border, inside Bangladesh because these were allegedly providing training facilities to anti-Indian insurgents. Bangladesh once again denied the presence of such facilities, but nevertheless agreed to monitor closely the activities of the religious schools known as madrassas.
Border demarcation
Both the foreign secretaries also identified completion of boundary demarcation, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as priorities that require "early resolution". India and Bangladesh share the longest land-boundary with each other. Menon stated that India would like to solve these problems as quickly as possible. He said, "Nothing holds us apart (on the issue)...If it suits us both, if it suits the situation on the ground, we will implement it soon."
Sharing of Water Resources
Regarding sharing of water resources, the two sides decided to leave it up to the upcoming meeting of the water-resources secretaries at the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to sort out details on common river water sharing, minor irrigation and drinking water schemes, flood-mitigation cooperation, and dredging and river bank protection work. The two foreign secretaries hoped to hold a Joint Rivers Commission meeting at the earliest after the JCE meeting.
Emphasis on increased connectivity
The two sides also stressed the need for greater land and train links. India agreed to send a team in the first week of July to coordinate outstanding logistical issues to start the long-awaited Dhaka-Kolkata rail-link. Menon observed that "there is a tremendous positive response" from the two countries towards the restoration of missing links. The chief advisor of Bangladesh caretaker government was also of the view that passenger and goods train service between the two countries will help peoples of both the countries.
Meeting with Chief Advisor
Menon made a courtesy call on Chief Adviser (CA) Fakhruddin Ahmed at his office. The CA said Bangladesh expects increased cooperation from India on key issues, particularly in water sharing, which is a common concern for both the countries. He mentioned that the last SAARC Summit in New Delhi undertook four priority issues--water (including flood control), food, energy and environment--to deal with, as they are vital for sustainability of the peoples of the countries in this region. He expressed his gratitude towards the government and the people of India for providing $10million assistance for the victims of landslides in Chittagong. Ahmed felt that foreign secretary-level meeting should be held on a regular basis for the stocktaking of bilateral relations. On the issue of use of Bangladeshi territory by insurgents and terrorists he said, "Bangladesh, as a matter of principle, does not allow its territory to be used by any force inimical to the interest of India."
Meeting with Khaleda and Hasina
Menon also met former Prime ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina separately who expressed their hope that India will take necessary steps to solve some prevailing issues between the two neighbouring countries to further boost up bilateral relationship. They expressed their hope to visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Shaivshankar Menon that the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh will be strengthened further through the meeting at the foreign secretary level.
Meeting separately, both the leaders elaborately discussed bilateral issues including the Ganges water-sharing accord, security, exchange of information, border terrorism, duty-free access of Bangladeshi goods to India, Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord and reducing of imbalanced trade deficit. At the meeting, Hasina told Menon that India is a friendly country and the Awami League will extend its cooperation to help develop the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Focusing on different initiatives taken by her government with India, Khaleda expressed her hope that the foreign secretary level meeting between the two countries will continue in future and problems will be solved through meetings and bilateral relationship will be boosted up.
No decision by Bangladesh on Indian Capital Investment
A major disappointment of the visit was the failure of Bangladesh caretaker government to take any decision on the multi-billion dollar investment proposals from two Indian business giants, Mittal and Tata. The Bangladesh side indicated that the present caretaker government wants an elected government to make the decisions over these proposals. Dhaka’s vacillation over these proposals has reportedly not made India too happy.
Conclusion
It is true that some ‘positive uptrend’ has been seen in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Both sides took advantage of improved political relations to discuss long-standing irritants such as demarcating 6.5km borderland, combating cross-border terrorism, greater access for Bangladeshi goods in India and improved road-rail connectivity. India has tried to deal with a major grievance of Bangladesh by allowing unilateral concessions. It plans to reduce duty level to zero and has removed the ‘non–tariff’ barrier so far vociferously criticized by Bangladesh. Some of the major issues however still remain. There was hardly any progress over the issue of use of Bangladesh territory by the Indian insurgent groups. Bangladesh is still in denial mode. It has not taken any major action against them. The interim government has also not taken any decision towards the Indian capital investment in Bangladesh. Bangladesh must realize that it has a limited export basket. Even with the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction of import duty to zero level, a huge trade gap will exist between India and Bangladesh. This will be so because Bangladesh does not have too many things to export. A change in this situation can be visualized only with the investment of Indian capital, which can expand the export basket of Bangladesh. It will also energize the economy of Bangladesh and improve intra-regional trade in south Asia. One hopes that progress on remaining issues are also made during the regime of present caretaker government, which in any case will be around till the end of 2008. The present caretaker wants an elected government to take decision on these issues. However, given the past track record of politicians of Bangladesh it appears difficult that any elected government in Bangladesh will have courage to act on these fronts. It appears, a beginning has to be made by the present dispensation, only then progress can be expected when elected governments takes charge.
India and Bangladesh had agreed to hold secretary-level talks annually, but flagging Dhaka-New Delhi relations turned the meetings into a biennial affair, held alternately in Dhaka in 2003 and in New Delhi in 2005. However, Bangladesh Foreign Adviser Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during their meeting in April on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in New Delhi promised regular secretary-level talks as part of a "new upward trajectory" in Dhaka-New Delhi relations. The recent meeting between Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain and Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was result of this.
India has been very clear in its approach towards the military backed caretaker government of Bangladesh headed by Fakharuddin Ahmed. This government displayed friendly attitude towards India unlike some of the previous governments that tried to capitalize by creating anti-India feeling among the Bangladeshi people. In contrast, certain steps taken by the caretaker government have arrested the continuous decline in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Though this government has put democracy on hold, so far it has not tried to throttle it. In fact, the steps taken by it appear to be taken with the intention to strengthen democracy in Bangladesh by purging the system of some of the evil practices which mainstream political parties have adopted since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised during the 14th SAARC Summit that India would accommodate duty-free access of products of the LDCs in the SAARC region, including Bangladesh, by December 2007. India now wanted to put into practice this promise. Bangladesh has been claiming for a long time that its exports to India were suffering because of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers. To remove these alleged ‘non-tariff barriers’ Dhaka and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to standardise their quality controls for certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems. Representatives from the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) and an Indian External Affairs Ministry official representing the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) signed the MoU. This step is likely to satisfy a long-pending demand of Bangladesh which thinks that it will help the country to expand its market in India.
Bangladesh has also demanded the removal of para-tariff barriers, which it claims raises the price of Bangladeshi exports in India due to Indian customs surcharges, additional charges, internal taxes and charges levied on imports, and decreased customs valuation. India has agreed to provide Bangladeshi goods with duty-free access to its market "in phases" by December 31. The next meeting of the Joint Working Group on Trade will attempt to sort out how to reduce the number of goods on India's "sensitive lists" protected from the duty-free arrangement. Both sides also discussed greater tariff cuts, coordinated development of land customs stations, establishing "border haats" and greater Indian investment into Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi side displayed a mature response to the cumulative trade gap of $7-8 billion with New Delhi. Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain said, "It will not happen overnight...I am sure we will reach a point where Bangladesh exports to India will increase." However, Bangladesh is drawing up its list of exportable items for the duty-free access. How far these steps will go to reduce the huge trade deficit Bangladesh has with India remains to be seen.
Sharing of Security Information
Both sides have also agreed to share security information regarding cross-border crimes and look to accelerate resolutions on border and water-resources sharing. The joint statement signed at the end of the meeting reads, "The two sides emphasised the need for enhanced security cooperation, particularly information sharing between the authorities concerned." The details of expanding security cooperation are likely to be discussed in the upcoming meeting of the home secretaries of the two countries. Of significance is the understanding forged to share intelligence information on cross border crimes. This could lead to enhanced security cooperation between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sharing security information, Menon said, "I think our securities are linked. We have a common security interest. Criminals, insurgents, terrorists--if any of these elements seek sanctuary, then it doesn't help either India or Bangladesh. We are both determined to work against this."
Issue of Support to Terrorism
Use of Bangladeshi territory by the insurgents and terrorists has been a sore point in the bilateral relationship of India and Bangladesh. During the recent meeting India wanted the military-backed interim government to dismantle the Islamic religious schools near the common border, inside Bangladesh because these were allegedly providing training facilities to anti-Indian insurgents. Bangladesh once again denied the presence of such facilities, but nevertheless agreed to monitor closely the activities of the religious schools known as madrassas.
Border demarcation
Both the foreign secretaries also identified completion of boundary demarcation, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as priorities that require "early resolution". India and Bangladesh share the longest land-boundary with each other. Menon stated that India would like to solve these problems as quickly as possible. He said, "Nothing holds us apart (on the issue)...If it suits us both, if it suits the situation on the ground, we will implement it soon."
Sharing of Water Resources
Regarding sharing of water resources, the two sides decided to leave it up to the upcoming meeting of the water-resources secretaries at the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to sort out details on common river water sharing, minor irrigation and drinking water schemes, flood-mitigation cooperation, and dredging and river bank protection work. The two foreign secretaries hoped to hold a Joint Rivers Commission meeting at the earliest after the JCE meeting.
Emphasis on increased connectivity
The two sides also stressed the need for greater land and train links. India agreed to send a team in the first week of July to coordinate outstanding logistical issues to start the long-awaited Dhaka-Kolkata rail-link. Menon observed that "there is a tremendous positive response" from the two countries towards the restoration of missing links. The chief advisor of Bangladesh caretaker government was also of the view that passenger and goods train service between the two countries will help peoples of both the countries.
Meeting with Chief Advisor
Menon made a courtesy call on Chief Adviser (CA) Fakhruddin Ahmed at his office. The CA said Bangladesh expects increased cooperation from India on key issues, particularly in water sharing, which is a common concern for both the countries. He mentioned that the last SAARC Summit in New Delhi undertook four priority issues--water (including flood control), food, energy and environment--to deal with, as they are vital for sustainability of the peoples of the countries in this region. He expressed his gratitude towards the government and the people of India for providing $10million assistance for the victims of landslides in Chittagong. Ahmed felt that foreign secretary-level meeting should be held on a regular basis for the stocktaking of bilateral relations. On the issue of use of Bangladeshi territory by insurgents and terrorists he said, "Bangladesh, as a matter of principle, does not allow its territory to be used by any force inimical to the interest of India."
Meeting with Khaleda and Hasina
Menon also met former Prime ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina separately who expressed their hope that India will take necessary steps to solve some prevailing issues between the two neighbouring countries to further boost up bilateral relationship. They expressed their hope to visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Shaivshankar Menon that the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh will be strengthened further through the meeting at the foreign secretary level.
Meeting separately, both the leaders elaborately discussed bilateral issues including the Ganges water-sharing accord, security, exchange of information, border terrorism, duty-free access of Bangladeshi goods to India, Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord and reducing of imbalanced trade deficit. At the meeting, Hasina told Menon that India is a friendly country and the Awami League will extend its cooperation to help develop the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Focusing on different initiatives taken by her government with India, Khaleda expressed her hope that the foreign secretary level meeting between the two countries will continue in future and problems will be solved through meetings and bilateral relationship will be boosted up.
No decision by Bangladesh on Indian Capital Investment
A major disappointment of the visit was the failure of Bangladesh caretaker government to take any decision on the multi-billion dollar investment proposals from two Indian business giants, Mittal and Tata. The Bangladesh side indicated that the present caretaker government wants an elected government to make the decisions over these proposals. Dhaka’s vacillation over these proposals has reportedly not made India too happy.
Conclusion
It is true that some ‘positive uptrend’ has been seen in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Both sides took advantage of improved political relations to discuss long-standing irritants such as demarcating 6.5km borderland, combating cross-border terrorism, greater access for Bangladeshi goods in India and improved road-rail connectivity. India has tried to deal with a major grievance of Bangladesh by allowing unilateral concessions. It plans to reduce duty level to zero and has removed the ‘non–tariff’ barrier so far vociferously criticized by Bangladesh. Some of the major issues however still remain. There was hardly any progress over the issue of use of Bangladesh territory by the Indian insurgent groups. Bangladesh is still in denial mode. It has not taken any major action against them. The interim government has also not taken any decision towards the Indian capital investment in Bangladesh. Bangladesh must realize that it has a limited export basket. Even with the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction of import duty to zero level, a huge trade gap will exist between India and Bangladesh. This will be so because Bangladesh does not have too many things to export. A change in this situation can be visualized only with the investment of Indian capital, which can expand the export basket of Bangladesh. It will also energize the economy of Bangladesh and improve intra-regional trade in south Asia. One hopes that progress on remaining issues are also made during the regime of present caretaker government, which in any case will be around till the end of 2008. The present caretaker wants an elected government to take decision on these issues. However, given the past track record of politicians of Bangladesh it appears difficult that any elected government in Bangladesh will have courage to act on these fronts. It appears, a beginning has to be made by the present dispensation, only then progress can be expected when elected governments takes charge.
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